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Foreign Direct Investment from China:
Sense and Sensibility
By Angela Huyue Zhang*
Abstract: Inspired by psychological studies on human judgment, this Article
represents the first attempt to provide a systematic account of how various heuristics
and cognitive biases can influence public perception as well as regulatory response to
foreign direct investment. In particular, it catalogues the main social and cognitive
mechanisms through which various well-organized interest groups can exploit public
fear of foreign direct investment from China. By closely studying two examples—the
U.S. Congress’ hostile response to CNOOC’s attempted acquisition of Unocal and the
European Commission’s increased antitrust scrutiny of Chinese state-owned
enterprises’ acquisitions in Europe—this Article shows how undue fear of Chinese
investment can lead to counterproductive regulatory response. Contrary to the
popular perception that Chinese state-owned enterprises are mere puppets of the
government, this Article draws attention to the pervasive but neglected agency
problems that have powered the surge of Chinese outward investment. It calls for
more effortful thinking by Western policymakers and cautions against extreme
precautionary measures for investment from China. At the same time, however, it
questions the wisdom of overseas investment by Chinese state-owned enterprises.
Empire building incentives, exacerbated by weak corporate governance structures
and the lack of financial disclosure, make it highly likely that state assets are
squandered in overseas acquisitions.

* J.S.D. (2011), J.D. (2008), and LL.M (2006), University of Chicago; Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in
Law, King’s College London. I am grateful for insightful comments from Judge Posner, Song Alex
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Yasheng Huang, and Paul Slovic. I also thank participants at the law faculty workshop at King’s
College London, and at the “Owned by China: Economic, Political, and Security Risks and
Opportunities of Chinese Direct Investment in the World” conference at Woodrow Wilson School of
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I. INTRODUCTION
The meteoric rise of China has astonished the world. By any standard,
China’s economic performance over the past three decades has been
impressive. Gross domestic product (GDP) has grown at an average of ten
percent each year and hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out
of poverty.1 China is now the largest manufacturer, the largest exporter,
and the second largest economy in the world.2 Even if China grows a third
as slowly in the future compared with its past, economists estimate that it
will still surpass the United States in economic size by 2030.3 In 2012,
China boasted seventy-three companies on the Fortune 500 list, surpassing
1
See WORLD BANK, CHINA 2030: BUILDING A MODERN, HARMONIOUS, AND CREATIVE HIGHINCOME SOCIETY XV (2013), available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/02/27/china2030-executive-summary.
2
Id.
3
Id.
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Japan in number of multinational companies; it now ranks second on the
global list, immediately behind the United States.4
While the West has described China as a “rising power,” China sees
itself as a “returning power.”5 As Henry Kissinger acutely observes, from
the perspective of the Chinese, “[T]he prospect of a powerful China
exercising influence in economic, cultural, political and military affairs” is
only “a return to the normal state of affairs.”6 Indeed, China was one of the
most advanced and powerful countries in the world before the modern era,
but its influence declined precipitately with the ascendency of the West
during the Industrial Revolution.7 It is thus no surprise that the new
Chinese leader Xi Jinping is now trumpeting a “great renaissance of the
Chinese nation” to appeal to popular nationalistic sentiments.8
But this is not the way the West sees China. Indeed, the rise of China
has inspired a mix of awe, fear, and skepticism. As observed by China
expert Peter Nolan: “The over-riding sentiment in both Europe and the
USA is fear.”9 The fear of China is pervasive and comprehensive: there is
fear of its growing military clout, 10 fear of Chinese espionage and
penetration, 11 fear that its trade dominance will weaken domestic
manufacturing sectors and cause widespread unemployment,12 fear of the
secretive Chinese communist party,13 fear of poor enforcement of product
quality and safety standards for Chinese products,14 and fear of the lack of
protection for intellectual property rights.15 The list goes on.
4

Global 500, FORTUNE, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
HENRY KISSINGER, ON CHINA 546 (2012).
6
Id.
7
JUSTIN YIFU LIN, DEMYSTIFYING THE CHINESE ECONOMY 1 (2012).
8
Jane Cai & Verna Yu, Xi Jinping Outlines His Vision of ‘Dream and Renaissance,’ S. CHINA
MORNING POST (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1193273/xi-jinping-outlineshis-vision-chinas-dream-and-renaissance.
9
PETER NOLAN, IS CHINA BUYING THE WORLD? 3 (2012).
10
See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND
SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2013 (2013), available at
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf.
11
See, e.g., STEVE DEWEESE ET AL., CAPABILITY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO
CONDUCT CYBER WARFARE AND COMPUTER NETWORK EXPLOITATION (2009); see also OFFICE OF THE
NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN SPIES STEALING US ECONOMIC SECRETS IN
CYBERSPACE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL
ESPIONAGE, 2009–2011 (2011).
12
See, e.g., ROBERT E. SCOTT, ECON. POLICY INST., THE CHINA TOLL (2012), available at
http://www.epi.org/publication/bp345-china-growing-trade-deficit-cost/.
13
See, e.g., RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA’S COMMUNIST
RULERS (1st ed. 2010).
14
See, e.g., U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF
INVESTMENTS AND PRODUCTS FROM THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SECTOR (2011).
15
U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, CHINA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT, INDIGENOUS
5
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Yet one of the biggest fears about China that has emerged in recent
years is one of being “owned by China.”16 Since the financial crisis in
2008, the growing prowess of Chinese firms and their rapid expansion in
mature markets has inflamed global fears that China is “taking over” the
world. Such fear is amplified by the fact that foreign direct investment
(FDI) 17 from China is dominated by state-owned or state-controlled
enterprises (SOEs). 18 As Chinese SOEs are often perceived as mere
puppets of their state master, speculation about the political motives of
Chinese outward investment abounds. Accordingly, Western regulators are
becoming increasingly concerned that Chinese investment constitutes a
disruptive force in host economies.19
But the controversy about Chinese FDI hardly marks the first time that
anxiety and opposition have been directed toward a foreign nation’s
investment activity. Indeed, FDI has been controversial from the start.
Economists have debated its costs and benefits to host countries, politicians
have wrangled over the economic and national security implications of
foreign powers controlling domestic economies, and lawmakers have
disagreed on how to optimally regulate FDI. While the literature on FDI is
voluminous, this Article represents the first attempt to apply psychology in
order to provide a systematic account of how various heuristics and
cognitive biases can influence public perception as well as regulatory
responses to FDI. It first traces the sources of undue fear of FDI and
INNOVATION POLICIES, AND FRAMEWORKS FOR MEASURING THE EFFECTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY
(2010), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4199.pdf.
16
NOLAN, supra note 9, at 10.
17
The concept of FDI is elusive. Traditionally it has been defined as the “ownership of assets in
one country by residents of another for purposes of controlling the use of those assets.” See EDWARD
M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (3rd ed.
1995). In practice, however, the nationality of a firm is difficult to identify and the concept of what
constitutes “control” is controversial. See id. at 8–10. For the purposes of this Article, FDI from China
is defined generally as outward investment made by companies residing in China (excluding wholly
foreign-owned enterprises) and their overseas subsidiaries. These Chinese investments can take the
form of greenfield investment or acquisitions of more than 10% ownership interest in existing foreign
companies. See discussion infra Part II.C.
18
According to the official data by Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), SOEs accounted
for more than 55% of total Chinese outward investment in the non-financial sector in 2011. See
MOFCOM, NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA & STATE ADMIN. OF
FOREIGN EXCH., 2011 STATISTICAL BULLETIN OF CHINA’S OUTWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
11 (2012) [hereinafter 2011 STATISTICAL BULLETIN OF CHINA’S OUTWARD FDI].
19
See, e.g., ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, AN ANALYSIS
OF CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 118 (2012), available at http://origin.www.uscc.gov/
sites/default/files/Research/11-7-12_An_Analysis_of_Chinese_Investments_in_the_U.S._Economy(CTI).pdf
(“These entities [SOEs] are potentially disruptive because they frequently respond to policies of the
Chinese government, which is the ultimate beneficial owner of U.S. affiliates of China’s SOEs.
Likewise, the government behaves like an owner, providing overall direction to SOE investments,
including encouragement on where to invest, in which industries, and to what ends.”).
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explores people’s difficulties in assessing its risks, and then connects those
difficulties to FDI regulations.
This methodology is by no means country specific. However, Chinese
FDI provides a particularly intriguing context to study how heuristics and
cognitive biases can lead to irrational policy response. For the past
century, FDI has flowed almost exclusively from developed countries to
developing countries. The influx of Chinese FDI to the Western world
represents the first reversal of such a trend, a new phenomenon that neither
the Western public nor regulators are familiar with. Unfamiliarity also
entails much uncertainty as to the nature of the potential harm of Chinese
investment and the likelihood of such harm occurring. When information
is scarce, there is a tendency for people to rely on their intuition to make
judgments. But overreliance on intuition can lead people astray in forming
misconceived judgments.20
This Article does not argue that none of the fears about Chinese FDI
are justified or that all Western response to Chinese FDI is irrational. In
fact, it is perfectly rational for the Western public and regulators to have
doubts about Chinese FDI. Even after several rounds of privatization
reform, the Chinese government still retains a significant interest in a large
portion of the Chinese economy. According to the latest estimate from a
U.S. congressional report, SOEs account for more than 40% of China’s
non-agricultural GDP. 21 Although many of these Chinese SOEs have
adopted a modern corporate governance structure and are listed on
domestic and international stock exchanges, the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) continues to exercise control over the appointments of their
leadership.22 The political control over personnel, coupled with opaque
governance structures (especially at the holding company level, where
corporations are wholly owned by the government and thus not subject to
public listing rules), cast a long shadow over the independence of Chinese
SOEs.23 Moreover, the Chinese government’s recent campaign to actively
encourage its domestic companies to “go global” further invites suspicion
about the motivations of those Chinese SOEs pursuing overseas
investment.24
20
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 49 (2004)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON].
21
See ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI & COLE KYLE, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, AN
ANALYSIS OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND STATE CAPITALISM IN CHINA (2011).
22
Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 737 (2013); see also Hon S. Chan,
Cadre Personnel Management in China: The Nomenklatura System, 1990–1998, 179 CHINA Q. 703 (2004).
23
See Angela Huyue Zhang, The Single-Entity Theory: An Antitrust Time Bomb for Chinese StateOwned Enterprises?, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 805, 815 (2012).
24
In a recent speech to Chinese diplomats, former Prime Minister Wen Jiabao stated the following:
“We should hasten the implementation of our ‘going-out’ strategy and combine the utilization of
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But what skeptics often fail to realize is that no FDI is free of risk—
any investment from foreign countries can pose potential political and
economic risks to the host country. The crucial task is not only the
identification of the possible risks, but also the evaluation of the magnitude
of such risks and the likelihood that such risks will materialize. Regulators
must consider both the benefits that Chinese FDI could bring and the
potential costs of blocking such investment. Unfortunately, intuitive and
emotional responses often trump careful cost and benefit analysis during
policy debates. For Western regulators to make informed decisions about
Chinese FDI, it is extremely important that they consider the typical
scenarios where people overreact to Chinese FDI, as well as circumstances
where undue fear of Chinese FDI is exploited by various social forces that
ultimately lead to ineffective or even counterproductive regulatory
responses.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II identifies anomalies in
perception about FDI and explores how various heuristics and biases can
lead to undue fear of investment from China. Part III describes the social
mechanisms through which various well-organized interest groups can
promote, amplify, and exploit public fear of Chinese FDI to advance their
own agendas. Part IV surveys FDI regulations in both the United States
and Europe and explores how irrational thinking about Chinese FDI can
lead to a counterproductive regulatory response. This part focuses on two
representative examples: the U.S. Congress’ hostile response to CNOOC’s
attempted acquisition of Unocal in 2005 and the recent European
Commission’s (the Commission) increased antitrust scrutiny of Chinese
SOEs’ acquisitions in Europe. Part V studies how agency problems at
Chinese SOEs—which tend to be neglected or even ignored by Western
regulators—have powered the surge of Chinese FDI. Part VI concludes
with policy implications and final thoughts.
II. COGNITIVE BIAS, EMOTION, AND FDI
This Article was inspired by the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky, two leading psychologists on human judgment. In 1974,
Kahneman and Tversky published a path-breaking article in Science
Magazine entitled Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.25
foreign exchange reserves with the ‘going out’ of our enterprises.” See Jamil Anderlini, China to
Deploy Foreign Reserves, FIN. TIMES (July 21, 2009, 7:09 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b576ec86761e-11de-9e59-00144feabdc0.html; see also Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., State Owned
Enterprise in China: Reviewing the Evidence (Occasional Paper, Jan. 26, 2009) (noting that the main
goals of the “go global” strategy include enlarging global markets, exploiting natural resources abroad,
attaining higher technologies, and enhancing the corporate brand values of Chinese enterprises).
25
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
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Their article shows that people often make decisions on the basis of
heuristic devices (the simplifying shortcuts of intuitive thinking), which
may work well in many circumstances but can also lead to systematic
errors. The article was an instant success and has inspired scholars in many
fields, including finance, law, statistics, and philosophy. Indeed, the past
decade has seen increasing enthusiasm for the behavioral analysis of law in
the United States.26 One of the leading thinkers in this field is Cass
Sunstein, who has made significant contributions in applying studies on
heuristics and biases to the analysis of risk, regulation, and public policy.27
Sunstein believes that biased reactions to risks are an important source of
erratic and misplaced priorities in public policy. 28 In particular, he
introduces a general framework for thinking about the precautionary
measures adopted by regulators in reaction to irrational responses to risks.29
He argues that such a framework is necessary as regulators can be prone to
the same cognitive biases that affect wider publics, and because they may
want to exploit public fear to advance political agendas. 30 Although
Sunstein’s work focuses on environmental, food, and security regulation, a
similar framework of analysis can be applied to the study of FDI regulation
and public policy. The fundamental task of FDI regulation for any country
is to decide how to deal with the risks posed by FDI—essentially a matter
of judgment under uncertainties.
Building on a vast body of literature on psychology, law, political
science, and economics, this Article explores the underlying dynamics of
fear of FDI. From time to time the rapid rise of FDI hits a nerve in host
countries, triggering fear that foreign countries are taking over the
economy. But too often, the public panic about the threat of FDI is based
on rapid intuitive thinking, guided directly by people’s impressions and
feelings. This can lead them to form misconceived judgments about FDI.
Moreover, when people are fearful of FDI, governments are likely to
respond by tightening regulations. Furthermore, regulators themselves can
also resort to intuitive thinking and overreact to FDI, especially when they
SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
26
See, e.g., Christine M. Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein
ed., 2000); CHRISTINE M. JOLLS, BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (2010); see also Joshua D.
Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and
Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1054 (2012). The authors compiled statistics
documenting this phenomenon of increased legal academic interest in behavioral law and economics. Id.
27
See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS (2007)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS]; SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 20.
28
See generally SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 27, at 13–106.
29
Id. at 109–48.
30
Id.
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are confronted with a novel situation where the risks of FDI are difficult to
assess. What the public and regulators often fail to realize, however, is that
regulation can come at a dear cost, and can itself pose risks to economic
health and national security. To avoid the self-defeating tendencies of
undue fear, it is extremely important to identify how people’s thinking
about FDI can go wrong and how such errors can lead to ineffective and
even counterproductive law and policy.
A. Dual Process of Mind
Abundant research in psychology has identified the existence of a dual
process of mind.31 Referring to processes similar to those traditionally
called “intuition” and “reason,” psychologists Keith Stanovich and Richard
West label them as “System 1” and “System 2,” respectively.32 System 1 is
rapid, automatic, and intuitive; it operates quickly and without much effort
at self-control. 33 It is thus often prone to error. 34 System 2 is slow,
deliberative, and calculative; it allocates attention to the effortful mental
activities that demand it and is less prone to errors.35 While System 1
proposes quick answers to problems of judgment, System 2 operates as a
monitor that confirms or overrides those judgments.36
According to Kahneman, the core of System 1 thinking lies in
associative memory, which continually constructs a coherent interpretation
of the things that happen in our world.37 Therefore, System 1 can operate
as an associative machine—one that allows people to jump to conclusions.
Kahneman’s formula for this phenomenon is “what you see is all there
is.”38 Moreover, because people are more sensitive to the strength of
evidence than its weight, confidence is often determined by the coherence
of the story rather than the quality or quantity of the evidence.39 As such,
people are far too willing to believe findings based on inadequate evidence

31
See, e.g., Shelly Chaiken, Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of
Source Versus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 752 (1980); Daniel
Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representatives Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment,
in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 51 (Thomas Gilovich,
Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002).
32
Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the
Rationality Debate?, 23 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 645, 658–59 (2000).
33
Id. at 658.
34
Id. at 659.
35
See SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 27, at 68.
36
See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 31.
37
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 13 (2011).
38
Id. at 86.
39
See generally Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of
Confidence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411 (1992).
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and are prone to collect too few observations in making decisions.
Furthermore, people tend to seek data and analyses that are likely to be
compatible with their intuitive thinking and beliefs, which can contribute to
confirmation basis.40 This contrasts with System 2 thinking, which is in
charge of doubting and disbelieving.41
One salient manifestation of System 1 thinking is the difficulty people
have with statistical thought. People tend to solve inductive problems by
the use of a variety of intuitive heuristics. Statistics, however, require
people to make summary judgments of complex information. Accordingly,
they tend to make errors when these heuristics diverge from the correct
statistical approach.42 In the context of FDI, public alarm is often caused
by the impression of a sudden surge of foreign capital flowing into the
domestic economy.43 Such impressions are mostly formed on the basis of
widespread media reports, particularly those reports that cite vivid
examples of high-profile foreign takeovers and that warn of the dire
consequences of a takeover of the domestic economy by foreign
companies. System 1 thinking can thus operate as a mechanism for people
to jump to the conclusion that FDI poses a threat to the host economy.
Indeed, few would go the extra mile to conduct a statistical study in order
to get the full picture of the FDI phenomenon. Such impulsive thinking
dominated the American public perception of Japanese FDI three decades
ago.
In the 1980s, a sudden surge of FDI into the United States was the
subject of concern in Congress, the media, and academic circles. The
public debate targeted Japan, which was accused of seeking global
dominance. Japanese purchases of iconic American companies and luxury
real estate, such as Columbia Pictures, the Empire State Building,
Rockefeller Centre, and Pebble Beach Golf Course generated sensational
headlines and evoked economic, socio-cultural, and political fears among
the American public and regulators.44 Americans began to fear that the
Japanese were “taking over” the U.S. economy.45 According to a 1988
public opinion survey conducted by the polling firm of Smick-Medley and
40

KAHNEMAN, supra note 37, at 81.
Id.
42
See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness,
3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430 (1972); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of
Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 237 (1973); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A
Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973).
43
EDWARD M. GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT 95 (2006).
44
Wei He & Marjorie A. Lyles, China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 51 BUS. HORIZON
485, 486 (2008).
45
C.S. Eliot Kang, U.S. Politics and Greater Regulation of Inward Foreign Direct Investment, 51
INT’L ORG. 301, 317 (1997).
41
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Associates, 73% of respondents believed the Japanese invested the most in
the United States, while only 3% believed the British did.46 This fear of
Japanese expansion into the United States was epitomized by public furor
against Fujitsu’s 1986 bid for Fairchild Semiconductor, a leading American
computer chip firm. U.S. regulators viewed this acquisition as an attempt
by Japanese companies to dominate the world semiconductor market,
which would not only affect U.S. market share in the semiconductor
industry, but also affect national security. 47 Confronted with the
overwhelming negative political response, Fujitsu decided to withdraw its
bid.
But these common perceptions about Japanese investment in the
United States were not borne out by data. During this period, the United
Kingdom was the top investor whereas Japan only ranked third in terms of
assets invested in the United States. 48 Second, the growing foreign
investment into the United States was not primarily a U.S.–Japan issue.
According to leading FDI experts Edward Graham and Paul Krugman,
Japanese firms accounted for only a small fraction of both the level of
foreign presence and its growth in the United States (except for the banking
sector), even though they had increased considerably in relative
importance.49 In fact, various data sources indicate that foreign investment
(including that from Japan) in U.S. real estate was very tiny.50
Importantly, few realized that the increased foreign presence in the
United States, including the increased FDI from Japan, was only part of a
globalization trend rather than a phenomenon unique to the United States.51
From 1985 to 1990, FDI in the United States grew from approximately
$185 billion to $395 billion, representing an annual growth rate of 16%.52
While this seems to be a massive increase, the total worldwide inward FDI
stock also grew from $972.2 billion to $1,950.3 billion, representing an
annual growth rate of 15%, closely similar to the growth rate of the United

46
NORMAN J. GLICKMAN & DOUGLAS P. WOODWARD, THE NEW COMPETITORS: HOW FOREIGN
INVESTORS ARE CHANGING THE U.S. ECONOMY 32 (1989) (citing Smick-Medley & Assoc., Foreign
Investment: A Smick-Medley and Associates Public Opinion Survey of U.S. Attitudes 12 (Smick-Medley
White Paper, 1988)).
47
Barry K. Robinson, Practical Comments on the Exon-Florio Provisions and Proposed
Regulations, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS 1990: THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 173, 182 (1989); see also Paul I. Djurisic, Comment, The Exon-Florio Amendment: National
Security Legislation Hampered by Political and Economic Forces, 3 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 179, 184 (1990).
48
See GLICKMAN & WOODWARD, supra note 46, at 35.
49
GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 17, at 22–23.
50
Id. at 31.
51
GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 43, at 22–23.
52
TDBOR, World Investment Report 2004: The Shift Toward Services, Annex tbl.B.3, UNCTAD/
WIR/2004 (2004).
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States.53 Indeed, foreign-controlled firms had already played a significant
role in many other advanced countries, such as the United Kingdom and
France in the 1980s, and, therefore, much of the rise of inward FDI in the
United States could be viewed as a shift to the more typical position of
these developed countries.54 According to the 1993 UN World Investment
Report, from 1986 to 1991, the United States ranked only tenth out of
twenty-three industrialized countries in average FDI inflows as a share of
GDP. 55 Unfortunately, this fact was largely missed during the policy
debate on Japanese FDI.56 As the level of Japanese direct investment
reached record highs in the late 1980s, members of Congress remade the
long dormant rules and regulations targeting foreign acquisitions,
ultimately leading to the passage of the Exon-Florio Amendments of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Exon-Florio), a piece of
legislation that has had far reaching implications for FDI regulations in the
United States.57
The current hot debate over Chinese FDI could be “a case of déjà vu
for the United States.” 58 Indeed, the political backdrop against which
Chinese FDI takes place today also bears striking similarity to that of
Japanese FDI three decades ago—rising trade friction, continuing dispute
over currency manipulation, heated debates over state subsidies, and
perceptions of China’s increasing economic rise and the West’s relative
decline.59 Today media reports on Chinese FDI have mostly focused on its
rapid growth, as evidenced by recent examples of Chinese companies
snapping up well-known international brands such as IBM, Volvo, Chateau
de Viaud vineyard, Ferretti luxury yachts, and AMC Theatres. These
transactions make sensational headlines, as it is only a very recent
phenomenon that companies from emerging countries such as China have
started to venture overseas to make acquisitions in advanced countries.
The avalanche of such news reports could therefore provoke worries that

53

Id.
See GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 17, at 32–33.
55
See TDBOR, World Investment Report 1993: Transnational Corporations and Integrated International
Production, Annex tbl.3 (1993).
56
GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 43, at 22.
57
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 502, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
58
Curtis J. Milhaupt, Chinese Investment: A Case of Déjà Vu for the United States, 4 E. ASIAN F.Q.
1, 34 (2012).
59
See, e.g., Sophie Meunier, Political Impact of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in the
European Union on Transatlantic Relations 5 (European Parliament Briefing Paper, May 4, 2012); see
also Curtis Milhaupt, Is the U.S. Ready for FDI from China? Lessons from Japan in the 1980s, in
INVESTING IN THE UNITED STATES: A REFERENCE SERIES FOR CHINESE INVESTORS 2 (2008). To be
sure, Chinese FDI also has important features that can be distinguished from Japanese FDI. See infra
Part IV.
54
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Chinese firms are buying up the world.60
But such concerns are exaggerated. To be sure, Chinese FDI has been
increasing rapidly. Since China officially announced the “Go Global”
policy in 2000, FDI outflows jumped from a mere $1 billion in 2000 to
more than $74 billion in 2011, representing an average compound growth
rate of almost 50% annually.61 But the base of China’s FDI is very small.
The most recent official figures show that in 2011 China’s FDI stock
accounts for just $425 billion—a mere 2% of the global total.62 While
China had the sixth largest FDI outflows in 2011, it ranked thirteenth in
terms of FDI stock.63 In comparison, Japan’s FDI stock was more than
twice that of China’s, while the United States held more than ten times that
of China.64 Indeed, Chinese outward investment as a percentage of overall
GDP is much lower than most developed countries. In 2011, China’s
outward FDI stock to GDP ratio was only 6%, far below the global average
of 31% and the transitional economy average of 17%.65 China’s FDI stock
in both the United States and Europe remains trivial compared to the
aggregate. Based on statistics from China’s Ministry of Commerce and the
United Nations, in 2011 FDI inflows from China accounted for only 0.8%
of the total FDI inflows into the United States and less than 2% in
Europe.66 The weight of total Chinese FDI stock in these economies is
even more trivial, accounting for approximately 0.3% of the total in both
the United States and Europe in 2011.67
But even these figures can be deceiving, as the absolute number of
Chinese FDI flows is only a very crude estimate. The vast majority of
Chinese FDI goes to offshore tax havens. For instance, the top three
destinations for Chinese FDI flows in 2011 were Hong Kong, the British
Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands.68 In particular, Hong Kong alone
accounted for 53% of Chinese total outward investment flows. The top

60
See, e.g., FRANÇOIS GODEMENT, JONAS PARELLO-PLESNER & ALICE RICHARD, EUROPEAN
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE SCRAMBLE FOR EUROPE (2011) (“China is buying up Europe.
Its automobile manufacturers have bought MG and Volvo and taken a life-saving stake in Saab. Its
transportation firms are acquiring, leasing or managing harbours, airports, and logistical and assembly
bases across the continent. Its development bank is financing projects in Europe’s periphery much like
it does in Africa.”); see also various news reports about Chinese outbound acquisitions infra notes 137–38.
61
See 2011 STATISTICAL BULLETIN OF CHINA’S OUTWARD FDI, supra note 18, at 5.
62
Id. at 4.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
See TDBOR, World Investment Report 2012: Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies,
Annex tbl.7, http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=171.
66
Id. Annex tbl.1.1; 2011 STATISTICAL BULLETIN OF CHINA’S OUTWARD FDI, supra note 18, at 9–10.
67
See TDBOR, supra note 65, Annex tbl.1.2; 2011 STATISTICAL BULLETIN OF CHINA’S OUTWARD
FDI, supra note 18, at 15.
68
See 2011 STATISTICAL BULLETIN OF CHINA’S OUTWARD FDI, supra note 18, at 9.
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three destinations together accounted for 69% of the total, whereas only
less than 3% of Chinese FDI went to the United States.69 Due to the
inherent secrecy of these tax havens, the ultimate destinations of Chinese
FDI flows are difficult to reveal. These countries are gateways for FDI
because they offer professional services and institutional support
unavailable in China and can give Chinese investors the cover of another
nationality.70 Some of these investments in fact reflect the phenomenon of
“round-tripping,” whereby funds are moved abroad and then reinvested in
China to benefit from the advantageous terms that the Chinese government
provides for foreign investors.71 While some of the financial advantages
provided by the Chinese government, such as favorable tax treatments,
have been phased out in recent years, some advantages still remain in many
circumstances.72 Therefore, if a large portion of Chinese FDI flows to
Hong Kong is ultimately reinvested back into mainland China, then the
absolute number of Chinese FDI flows probably overstates its true amount.
On the other hand, if some of the funds invested in tax havens are
redirected to other countries such as those in Europe or the United States,
then the value of Chinese investment in those regions should be higher than
the current figures suggest. Recognizing the shortcomings of the official
data, Daniel Rosen and Thilo Hanemann from the Rhodium Group
compiled their own dataset to monitor Chinese FDI.73 While their figures
are higher than official data, they are still small by any standard. For
instance, they estimated that China’s outward investment would account
for a mere 4% of total EU FDI inflows in 2010.74 Thus it seems that even
if the Chinese FDI figures are adjusted upwards, it would still have a
miniscule presence in Western countries.
The above analysis illustrates the important role that statistics can play
in informing FDI policy making, but unfortunately its importance is often
overlooked during policy debate. Instead, people rely on intuition and
resort to various mental shortcuts when making judgments about FDI. As
discussed in detail below, various heuristics and biases could be the major
source of misconceptions about FDI.

69

Id.
See Randall Morck et al., Perspectives on China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 39 J.
INT’L BUSINESS STUDIES 337, 339–40 (2008); see also Ivar Kolstad & Arne Wigg, What Determines
Chinese Outward FDI, 47 J. WORLD BUSINESS 26, 28 (2012).
71
Morck et al., supra note 70, at 340.
72
DANIEL H. ROSEN & THILO HANEMANN, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., CHINA’S CHANGING
OUTBOUND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PROFILE: DRIVERS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3 n.10
(2009), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb09-14.pdf.
73
THILO HANEMANN & DANIEL H. ROSEN, RHODIUM GRP., CHINA INVESTS IN EUROPE: PATTERNS,
IMPACTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 35–36 (2012).
74
Id. at 35.
70
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B. Loss Aversion
People tend to be loss averse.75 They have the tendency to strongly
prefer avoiding losses rather than accruing gains. Consider the following
experiment. If you are offered a gamble where there is a 50% chance of
winning $110 and 50% chance of losing $100, will you take this gamble?
The rational response is yes, as the expected gain ($55) clearly exceeds the
expected loss ($50). However, like most people, you probably will choose
not to play this game because the psychological cost of losing $100
outweighs the benefit of winning $110. It should be noted that loss
aversion is a deeply ingrained human trait that can be traced to
evolutionary history.76 Indeed, studies have found that organisms that treat
threats as more urgent have a better chance to survive and reproduce.77
Loss aversion has been applied to explain many anomalies in life.
One particularly interesting phenomenon is the “endowment effect,” that is,
the human tendency to demand more to give up a good than one would be
willing to pay to acquire it.78 But the endowment effect is not universal.
Merchants who trade goods for a living or financial traders who trade
stocks as their daily business activities do not suffer from the endowment
effect because they view their goods as carriers of value for future
exchanges.79 Another implication of loss aversion is that individuals have a
strong tendency to remain at the status quo, a phenomenon known as status
quo bias.80 In addition, loss aversion can influence people’s judgment
about fairness. Studies show that people’s perception of fairness strongly
depends on whether the question is framed as reduction in a gain or as a
loss.81
These psychological findings on loss aversion have important
implications for the study of risk regulation. Sunstein observed that people

75
See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler, The Psychology of Choice and Assumptions of Economics, in QUASI
RATIONAL ECONOMICS 137, 143 (1991); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler,
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1328 (1990).
76
See Arne Ohman, Fear and Anxiety as Emotional Phenomena: Clinical Phenomenology,
Evolutionary Perspectives, and Information-Processing Mechanisms, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 511,
520 (Michael Lewis et al. eds., 1993).
77
Id.
78
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent
Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039 (1991); see also Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler,
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 193,
196 (1991).
79
KAHNEMAN, supra note 37, at 294; see also John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate
Market Anomaly?, 118 Q.J. ECON. 41 (2003).
80
Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 78, at 196.
81
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 731 (1986).
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are closely attuned to losses produced by newly introduced risks or any
aggravating risks, but are far less concerned with the benefits that are
foregone as a result of regulation.82 In the context of FDI, loss aversion
and the endowment effect could explain some anomalies in people’s
thinking about the economic consequences of FDI. All around the world,
governments and national publics tend to be friendlier to greenfield
investments than to foreign acquisitions. 83 For example, greenfield
investors “are usually offered generous incentives” by local governments,
but foreign takeovers are often viewed with skepticism and “are sometimes
thwarted” for economic or political reasons, particularly when they involve
“strategic” industries.84 For instance, a national survey conducted by the
Pew Research Center in March 2006 found that 53% of Americans held a
negative view of foreign investors “owning” U.S. companies (foreign
acquisitions), whereas only 36% of Americans viewed foreign companies
“investing” in the United States (greenfield investment) as bad.85
From an economic standpoint, however, there seems to be little sense
in distinguishing greenfield investment and investment via acquisitions. In
fact, economic theory on FDI usually does not distinguish between
different modes of entry at all.86 Indeed, it has been generally recognized
that the primary expected economic benefits of inward FDI are productivity
gains—gains that can arise from either greenfield investments or
acquisitions.87 For instance, Krugman and Graham argue that the main
benefits of FDI in the United States—the facilitation of trade in goods,
services, and knowledge—generally apply regardless of investors’ mode of
entry; moreover, they argue that FDI only has an indirect and limited effect
on aggregate employment and net trade in the United States.88 Empirical
evidence also “suggests that the supposed advantages of greenfield
investment over” foreign acquisitions—“such as net job creation and the
building of export capacities—do not figure among the main benefits of
FDI.”89

82

SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 27, at 42.
OECD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES: FREEDOM OF INVESTMENT IN A CHANGING
WORLD 68 (2007). Generally speaking, Greenfield investment refers to a form of FDI where foreign
investors establish new operational facilities from the ground up in the host country.
84
Id. at 71.
85
News Release, Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Bush Approval Falls to 33%,
Congress Earns Rare Praise 2 (Mar. 15, 2006), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacypdf/271.pdf.
86
See GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 17, at 57–67.
87
See Magnus Blomstrom, Ari Kokko & Mario Zejan, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: FIRM AND
HOST COUNTRIES STRATEGIES 101–221 (2000); see also OECD, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOR
DEVELOPMENT: MAXIMISING BENEFITS, MINIMISING COSTS 9 (2002).
88
See GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, note 17, at 59–65.
89
See OECD, supra note 83, at 86.
83
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So why do people tend to be more friendly to greenfield investment
than to foreign acquisitions? This in part may have to do with loss aversion
and status quo bias. Greenfield projects are new investments that are
perceived to create job opportunities and, if the project generates exports,
to have a potentially positive impact on the trade balance. Thus there
appears to be obvious “gain” from greenfield investment but no obvious
“loss.” In contrast, foreign takeovers of domestic assets mean the host
country is ceding control of the domestic assets to foreign investors. Host
countries may be concerned that foreign acquisitions of domestic
enterprises could lead to workforce reductions and increased
unemployment. There may also be concern that foreign acquisitions could
lead to declining exports, as a parent company may decide that export
markets could best be served by affiliates elsewhere.90 Other concerns
include the loss of technological capabilities or loss of competitive
advantages if technology is actually transferred out of the host economy.91
People tend to fixate on the potential losses brought about by foreign
acquisitions, without investigating whether such concerns are legitimate,
whether the probable occurrence of such losses is high, or whether foreign
acquisitions may actually benefit the host economy. Indeed, these potential
“costs” loom large in people’s minds, and their aversion to loss could
therefore distort perception of the benefits of foreign takeovers, especially
when a particular public understands itself to be “endowed” with the
strategic assets of acquired firms. As such, they tend to resort to mental
shortcuts and jump to the conclusion that the cost of ceding control of
domestic assets outweighs the benefits gained from foreign acquisitions.
Endowment effects also affect people’s sense of fairness in terms of
FDI regulation. When people think they are endowed with their country’s
strategic assets, they tend to believe that it is fair for regulators to introduce
harsh measures to block foreigners from taking away those assets. One
good example is the French people’s overwhelming opposition to Pepsi’s
attempted acquisition of Danone in 2005.92 Danone is a leading French
food company and a source of enormous pride in France. As a “national
business champion,” Danone occupied a “special place in French hearts,”
whereas PepsiCo was viewed as “the ugly face of American capitalism.”93
The French people are so emotionally attached to Danone that no payoff
from PepsiCo was deemed sufficient to compensate for the psychological
cost of ceding control of a leading French business to an American firm.
Although Pepsi ultimately denied its intention to acquire Danone, the case
90

Id. at 85.
Id. at 86.
92
Franck Riboud, France Flouts the Pepsi Challenge, TELEGRAPH (July 24, 2005),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2919479/France-flouts-the-Pepsi-challenge.html.
93
Id.
91
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prompted the French government to take preemptive action to introduce
laws protecting companies in strategic industries such as Danone.94
C. Availability Heuristic
The “availability heuristics” refers to the process through which
people judge the frequency of an event by the ease with which instances
can be brought to mind.95 If a salient event is highly publicized by the
media, people tend to think an event is more probable as they can recall an
occurrence more easily. For instance, immediately after the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001, many people were scared of flying and
chose to drive instead without being aware that driving is a more dangerous
form of transportation.96 On the other hand, when the risks are not easily
accessible and available, people tend to ignore them.97 As psychologist
Paul Slovic asserts: “What is out of sight is effectively out of mind.”98
Availability heuristics do not exist in a social vacuum, as suggested by Tim
Kuran and Cass Sunstein, who have studied the social mechanisms that
govern the availability of information.99 They observe that availability
heuristics interact with social processes, particularly informational and
reputational forces. According to the authors, when people communicate
their opinions to others, it creates an information externality. Thus, an
availability cascade is formed whenever individual uses of the availability
heuristic increase public availability of data pointing to a particular
interpretation or conclusion, and this increase in availability then triggers
reinforcing individual response.100
In the context of FDI, public sentiment regarding foreign investment
could also be swayed by availability heuristics. Consider a dramatic
incident such as the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11,
2001. Commentators observed that this event fundamentally changed the
perception of FDI held by many U.S. policymakers, many of whom have
called for greater consideration of the impact of FDI on national security.101
Congress’ fierce opposition to the attempted takeover by Dubai Customs
94
Inst. for Econ. & Soc. Research, New Legislation Aimed at Regulating Takeover Bids, EIRONLINE
(Sept. 1, 2006), http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2006/04/articles/fr0604039i.htm.
95
Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 25, at 1127.
96
Robert W. Hahn, The Economics of Airline Safety and Security: An Analysis of the White House
Commission’s Recommendations, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 791, 804 (1997).
97
See generally Sarah Lichtenstein, Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, Mark Layman & Barbara Combs,
Judged Frequency of Lethal Events: Human Learning and Memory, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 551 (1978).
98
See PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 107–09 (2000).
99
Timur Kuran & Cass Sustein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999).
100
Id. at 712.
101
JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34561, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL
SECURITY: ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS (2013).
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and Free Zone Corporation (Dubai Ports World) is a case in point. In 2006,
Dubai Ports World, a company based in United Arab Emirate (UAE),
proposed to purchase the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation
Company (P&O), a London-based company. P&O operates a number of
facilities worldwide including six ports in the United States. In January
2006, President Bush approved the transaction after Dubai Ports World
provided an assurance letter providing guarantees for certain security
standards to be met at the U.S. ports.102 However, because Dubai Ports
World is an investor based in a Middle Eastern nation, the deal attracted
overwhelmingly negative media attention and spurred impassioned debates
over the national security implications of allowing a Middle Eastern
company to assume control over important U.S. port facilities. 103
Americans’ fresh memories of the tragedies of September 11, a component
of the associative machine of System 1, dominated public judgment about
the transaction. Undue fears were propounded by gripping news headlines
such as “Dubai Ports Company in Al-Qaida Heartland.”104 The UAE was
depicted in the media as an “operational and financial base for the hijackers
who carried out the attacks of Sep. 11, 2001.”105
But the public debate about the risks posed by the Dubai Ports World
transaction was marked by great exaggeration. First of all, the UAE has
been an ally and friend of the United States post-September 11.106 Second,
it is the U.S. Coast Guard and customs authorities, not the port operators,
who are ultimately responsible for port security.107 Importantly, Dubai
Ports World had already given assurance that it would meet certain security
standards to address U.S. concern about national security risks. 108
Unfortunately, U.S. politicians did not emphasize these facts. Instead they
pointed to the “worst-case scenario,” suggesting that there could be dire
consequences of UAE control of U.S. ports. 109 Indeed, for many
Americans, the idea of terrorists conjures up intense images of disaster and
suffering. Even if the risks were really remote, Americans’ extreme
repulsion to terrorism after September 11 made it impossible for them to
102
Press Release, Dep’t of the Treasury, CFIUS and the Protection of the National Security in the
Dubai Ports World Bid for Port Operations (Feb. 24, 2006).
103
JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) (2014).
104
Stellar Dendrite, Peter King: Dubai Ports Company in “Al-Qaida Heartland,” NEWSMAX.COM
(Feb. 20, 2006), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1582224/posts.
105
Associated Press, More Objections to Port Takeover By Arab Entity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006,
at A9.
106
GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 43, at 139.
107
David D. Kirkpatrick & Patrick McGeehan, Pataki Joins Opposition to Takeover of Ports, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at B3.
108
GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 43, at 138.
109
Id. at 140.
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tolerate any risk posed by an acquisition by a Middle Eastern company.
Availability heuristics could similarly affect American attitudes
toward Chinese FDI today. For instance, the row against espionage
activities conducted by the Chinese government recently intensified in the
United States. In February 2013, Mandiant, a private security firm,
released a report that documents systematic cyber attacks originating from
a building in Shanghai.110 The Chinese military is suspected to be involved
in this attack, although there is no conclusive evidence to prove this. The
incident has received heightened attention from the U.S. government. In
response to mounting anger over Chinese cyber espionage, Congress
recently introduced a provision barring federal government purchases of
high-tech equipment produced by Chinese suppliers. 111 It is not clear
whether Congress has considered introducing any mitigating measures that
would reduce the risks inherent in allowing Chinese suppliers to participate
in U.S. networks (rather than blocking Chinese suppliers outright). Given
this new dynamic, FDI experts have warned that continuing allegations of
state-sponsored cyber attacks could create additional mistrust and suspicion
of Chinese companies seeking to invest in the United States.112
D. Affect Heuristic
“Feelings” play an important role in how people make judgments
about risk. Paul Slovic, a leading psychologist among scholars on risk, has
identified the inextricable link between availability heuristics and people’s
emotional reactions to risks.113 Slovic proposed that “affect,” a general
positive or negative feeling people may experience about a certain object,
can operate as a heuristic that affects people’s judgment about both benefits
and dangers.114 If a certain risk invokes strong feelings, people will tend to
resort to a mental shortcut by asking how they feel about the risk, instead of
making thoughtful deliberation in their evaluation of it. 115 Moreover,
people’s reactions to risks are often based on whether they can easily
imagine or visualize the “worst-case scenario.”116 If the outcome is vivid
and bad, it can evoke strong emotions. And when strong emotions are
110
MANDIANT, AP1: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS (2013), available at
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf.
111
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, H.R. 993, 113th Cong., § 516.
112
See Thilo Hanemann, Chinese FDI in the United States: Q1 2013 Update, RHODIUM GROUP
(Apr. 30, 2013).
113
Paul Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters & Donald G. MacGregor, The Affect Heuristic, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 397 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale
Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002).
114
Id.
115
SLOVIC, supra note 98, at 413–28.
116
SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 20, at 45.
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present, people will tend to ignore the probability that the outcome will
occur.117 Indeed, research suggests that sometimes people favor regulation
of certain risks because they focus on the harms, which are effectively onscreen while ignoring the compensating benefits which are off-screen.118
Affect heuristics have important implications for risk regulation. In
the context of FDI, the question the public faces is difficult (Is FDI
beneficial to our society?), whereas the answer to an easier and related
question (Do I like FDI?) comes readily to mind. Therefore, the public will
tend to answer the easier question, usually without noticing the
substitution. This is especially true when a foreign acquisition poses risks
to economic or national security. These sensitive sectors can readily
invoke negative feelings, which can in turn distort people’s perception of
benefits and thus produce irrational judgment of the merits of a potential
FDI transaction. Recent surveys of public opinion on FDI demonstrate that
people’s perceptions of FDI are influenced by their feelings toward the
country of origin: if they like a particular country, they tend to view FDI
from that country more favorably; if they dislike a certain country, they
tend to view FDI from that country more negatively.119
When affect heuristics are at work, negative public representations of
the Chinese government or Chinese companies could influence public
perception of Chinese FDI. If there is overwhelming anti-China sentiment
in a host country, Chinese FDI is not likely to be welcome, as people will
tend to judge Chinese FDI as bearing high risks and low benefits. Indeed,
many of the challenges posed to Chinese companies investing abroad may
have to do with a simple lack of trust in the Chinese government. This
could eventually contribute to a poisoned environment—one in which it
would be very difficult to conduct a policy debate about Chinese FDI.
For instance, U.S. regulators have thwarted Huawei’s several attempts
to acquire U.S. technology companies in recent years. In 2007, Huawei
and its partner investor Bain Capital Partners were forced to withdraw their
proposed joint acquisition of network equipment maker 3Com following
their failure to reach a mitigation agreement that adequately addressed the
U.S. government’s concern.120 Even though Huawei was only taking a
117
Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the Affective
Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. 185, 188 (2001).
118
SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 20, at 41 (citing HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH
RISK 75–92 (1997)).
119
Nathan M. Jensen & René Lindstädt, Globalization with Whom: Context-Dependent Foreign Direct
Investment Preferences (July 2013), http://pages.wustl.edu/files/pages/imce/nathanjensen/globalization_
with_whom_working_paper.pdf (The authors cited a Gallup poll finding that 77% of Americans had a
favorable view of Japanese FDI in comparison to a 42% favorability rating for Chinese FDI. The authors’
own survey found two times the support for Japanese FDI versus Chinese FDI into the United States.).
120
Press Release, 3Com, 3Com and Bain Capital Partners Announce Mutual Withdrawal of CFIUS
Application (Feb. 20, 2008).

414

ZHANG_FINAL_WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/3/14 7:25 PM

Foreign Direct Investment from China
34:395 (2014)

minority interest of 16.5% in 3Com, some Congressional members called
for blocking the transaction, reciting a litany of alleged espionage related
activities attributed to China, Huawei’s alleged ties to the Chinese
Liberation Army, and other publicly reported concerns over Huawei’s
business.121 In 2011, Huawei chose to divest the assets it acquired from
3Leaf, a bankrupt California technology company, after CFIUS made a
negative recommendation against this deal.122 In a recent report on the
national security issues posed by Huawei and ZTE (another leading
Chinese telecommunications firm), the U.S. House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence recommended that the United States view with
suspicion the continued penetration of the U.S. telecommunications market
by these Chinese companies and that it should block their investment in
any form.123
E. Some Reflections
To be sure, the vast majority of Chinese overseas investments are not
subject to national security review by the host governments, and most that
are reviewed are approved without any delay. So why are Western
governments able to overcome fear about Chinese FDI so often?124
First, partly due to loss aversion, greenfield investment tends to be
viewed more favorably by the host countries than acquisition and,
accordingly, is subject to much less regulatory review. For instance, data
collected by Rhodium Group indicates that almost 70 percent of Chinese
investment in the United States (in terms of numbers of deals) was
greenfield from 2000 to 2012.125 As Exon-Florio applies solely to foreign
acquisitions, greenfield investment by Chinese firms is not subject to
national security review.
Second, Chinese acquisitions of companies in nonstrategic sectors
tend to avoid controversy as dynamics—such as loss aversion, availability
heuristics, and affect heuristics—are more pronounced when the assets
involved are deemed indispensable and important for the host countries.
Third, Chinese companies that are looking to invest abroad are
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Bain Capital Drops Its Bid for 3Com, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 21, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB120603627253952409.html.
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Shayndi Raice & Andrew Dowell, Haiwei Drops U.S. Deal Amid Opposition, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
22, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703407304576154121951088478.html.
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U.S. HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 112TH CONG., INVESTIGATIVE
REPORT ON THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMPANIES HUAWEI AND ZTE (Oct. 8, 2012).
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I thank Scott Kennedy for suggesting this question.
125
China Investment Monitor, RHODIUM GROUP, http://rhg.com/interactive/china-investment-monitor
(last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
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typically assisted by legal advisors who can conduct careful assessment of
the regulatory risks in the host country. If a Chinese bid is likely to face
high regulatory hurdles in the host country, Chinese investors will probably
be advised against proceeding with the bid.126 Hence, it is not surprising
that the vast majority of deals that are subject to regulatory review are
approved because Chinese investors will probably not make a bid in the
first place if the deal is likely to be rejected.
This also suggests that Western regulators not only need to assess
whether they have made a proper decision with regard to those Chinese
acquisitions that have been made but that they also need to evaluate the
costs of deterring Chinese companies from investing in the first place. For
instance, the failed attempts of Chinese companies such as Huawei to
invest in the United States have sent a bad signal to many Chinese
companies that, partly influenced by availability heuristics, wrongly
believe that the U.S. government is hostile toward Chinese investors.127 As
a result, these companies decide to look elsewhere to invest.
III. EXPLOITING FEAR
Well-organized interest groups—including the media, the government,
and business rivals—can exploit and manipulate undue public fear of
foreign investment in order to advance their own personal agendas. In fact,
fears of foreign investment are likely to be generated endogenously by
special interests seeking a regulatory response. This aspect, however, is
often neglected during heated public debates on foreign investment.
A. Private Interest Groups
Self-interested private groups have incentives to exploit people’s fear.
They can advance their personal goals through publicizing vivid examples
of bad consequences of policies they contest and by encouraging
deliberation among like-minded people.128 A typical tactic includes the
exaggeration of risk and over stressing the worst-case scenario. In the
context of FDI, private interest groups include competing bidders, business
rivals, and other stakeholders who can utilize foreign investment review
processes to obtain leverage over other parties or to impact the timing and
certainty of the transaction.
For instance, there is an overwhelming consensus among FDI experts
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I thank Thilo Hanemann for suggesting this point.
Anthony Lin, Can China Change CFIUS?, LAW.COM (May 13, 2013), http://www.alm.law.com/
jsp/article.jsp?id=1202599753882&thepage=1.
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See SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 20, at 91.
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that the Dubai Ports World case was highly politicized.129 In particular, a
disgruntled supplier to the target company was believed to be the driving
force behind the political controversy in this case.130 The supplier was
Eller & Co., a small stevedoring firm in the United States that has had a
long-standing commercial dispute with the target American firm P&O. By
taking advantage of the post-September 11th anti-Arab sentiment, Eller &
Co. successfully stoked the flame in Washington to block the deal in order
to increase its leverage.131 Similarly, Huawei’s perennial political and legal
troubles in the United States seem to have been rooted in its patent disputes
with rival Cisco. Officials from Huawei point out that Cisco resorted to
lobbying U.S. politicians in response to the competition from Huawei,
which has become a more formidable competitor. 132 As discussed in
further detail in Part IV, Chevron, a rival bidder to CNOOC, played a key
role in Congress’ hostile actions toward CNOOC’s attempted acquisition of
Unocal. It has been reported that Chevron spent tremendous resources
enlisting supporters and lobbying Congress in order to block the CNOOC
acquisition.133
B. The Media
The media’s role in promoting a public discourse of fear is well
studied.134 Similar to private interest groups, mass media has the power to
influence underlying dynamics and amplify the salience of consequences.
There are two forces at work here. The first is the media’s incentive to
respond to people’s negativity bias.135 As people are loss averse, they tend
to pay more attention to and give more weight to negative rather than
positive experiences or information. In order to increase ratings and
viewership, the media will respond asymmetrically to information by
selectively choosing gripping instances to attract attention. 136 As the
saying goes: “If it bleeds, it leads.” The second force at work here is
availability heuristics. Kahneman has long observed that media coverage
129
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Id. at 139.
131
Id.
132
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Tech Firms, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-10/business/3550
0591_1_huawei-and-zte-chinese-government-cisco-systems.
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See Jonathan Weisman, In Washington, Chevron Works to Scuttle Chinese Bid, WASH. POST
(July 16, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/15/AR2005071501889.html.
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Q. 647 (1997).
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can warp people’s perception of risks: “The world in our heads is not a
precise replica of reality; our expectations about the frequency of events are
distorted by the prevalence and emotional intensity of the messages to
which we are exposed.”137 As a consequence, the media’s asymmetric
response to bad news can in turn amplify public fear of bad news, thus
leading to a vicious cycle in which availability heuristics and media
incentives aggravate each other.138
The media’s reaction to the influx of foreign capital into the United
States in the 1980s offers a good example. The growing foreign presence
in the United States sparked a flood of popular news articles and books at
that time, most of them expressing concern, but few media pieces defended
FDI. For instance, Time magazine ran a cover story in 1987 entitled The
Selling of America: Foreign Investors Buy, Buy, Buy. Others, however, ran
sensational headlines such as Foreign Investors: Allies or Aggressors?,
Foreigners Buy America, and A Nation Hooked on Foreign Funds. 139
Books on Japanese global dominance also mushroomed during this period.
These suggested that takeovers of U.S. firms by Japanese firms had reached
a dangerous level and that FDI would diminish U.S. technological
capabilities, threaten the U.S. tax base, and reduce the quality and quantity
of U.S. jobs.140 For instance, in Selling Out: How We Are Letting Japan
Buy Our Land, Our Industries, Our Financial Institutions, and Our Future,
published in 1990, the authors tell an alarming story of the transfer of
American companies and wealth into Japanese hands and characterize FDI
as an economic “war” in which America is dangerously defenseless.141 In
1992, Martin Tolchin and Susan Tolchin released their popular book
Selling Our Security: The Erosion of America’s Assets.142 In this book, the
authors presented a shocking picture of American manufacturers of critical
technologies being taken over by foreign investors and an America in grave
danger of losing its technological edge and becoming dependent on
overseas suppliers. They also warned that foreign investment threatened
America’s economic and political security and called for a stronger
government role in protecting critical industries.
Similarly, Clyde
Prestowtiz’s 1992 Trading Places: How We Are Giving Our Future to
137
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Japan elicited great anxiety and inflamed fear among the American public
that the Japanese were on the verge of dominating America.143 Yet these
dire predictions about the threat of Japanese investment simply never came
to pass. Rather than decline relative to Japan in the 1990s, U.S.
technological capabilities rose in large part because of the expansion of
information technology-based industries in the United States. 144 As
Graham and Marchick commented: “In hindsight, much of the furor over
Japanese FDI in the United States now seems exaggerated or even
downright silly.”145
Similar to the situation with Japan two decades ago, China is now at
the center of the media spotlight. In November 2010, the Economist
declared on its cover that “China Buys Up the World.”146 Other magazines
like Forbes and the Independent have run similar cover stories about the
Chinese shopping spree abroad.147 Books on China’s growing dominance
have become highly popular in recent years, with lurid titles including:
When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End
of the Western World; Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian
Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century; Eclipse: Living in the
Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance; and China, Inc.: How the Rise of
the Next Superpower Challenges America and the World.148 These news
headlines and books can therefore become a source of fear that China is
dominating the world and poses a threat to the West.
C. Governments
Driven by their own interests in re-election or promotion, government
officials in democratic societies respond to the public’s concern about risk
even if a particular fear is groundless. Kent Weaver, a political scientist,
has called this phenomenon “the politics of blame avoidance.”149 This is
rooted in the loss aversion of human beings, as voters tend to be more
sensitive to real or potential losses than to gains. As Weaver puts it:
143
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“Voters are more sensitive to what has been done to them than what has
been done for them.”150 In response to public demand, politicians are more
motivated to avoid blame for unpopular actions rather than to claim credit
for popular ones.151 As a result, governments tend to react in response to
temporary fear without investigating the facts and consequences—a
tendency that can come at a dear cost and impose risks of its own. For
instance, critics suggest that President George W. Bush’s administration
exaggerated the need for a “war on terrorism” in part because the
exaggeration served his political interests.152
In the context of FDI, it has been observed that those who were most
eager to revamp foreign investment policy in the United States in the 1970s
were members of Congress from districts and states receiving the bulk of
new investments rather than “members of some aggrieved interest group or
vigilant guardians of national security.”153 Reacting strongly to complaints
“in their voting districts about the invasion of the country by rich foreign”
multinationals, these congressional members introduced “bills ranging
from the prudent to the xenophobic.”154 While they “did not have access to
the accurate information needed to take sound policy positions, they had
little to lose” in arguing against foreign investment.155 Needing to appease
the popular demand for anti-foreigner policies, they had great incentive to
appear responsive, “to draw further attention to the issue and to
grandstand.”156
Another illustrative case is Dubai Ports World’s rebuffed attempt to
acquire six U.S. ports in 2006. When the public furor against this deal
rose, some members of Congress decided that they had to “do
something.”157 For instance, the congressional leaders denounced the deal
as “transfer[ing] title to the Devil.”158 Representative Peter King of New
York also warned against this deal, alleging that the UAE had been
involved with terrorists in the past: “This was only 4 1/2, five years ago
that they were very close to Bin Laden, they were supporting Taliban . . .
[a]nd unless there’s been a complete transformation, I have real
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concerns.”159 The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS), an inter-agency responsible for national security review, was
“excoriated . . . for their supposed lapse in judgment,” and “many in
Congress [] argue[d] for greater transparency in the CFIUS process.”160 To
appear tough on terrorism, some members of Congress threatened “to pass
legislation forcing [Dubai Ports] World to divest itself of its U.S.
holdings.”161 Prominent Senators Clinton and Menendez also introduced
legislation that would prohibit the sale of terminal operations to foreign
governments.162 To placate these concerns, Dubai Ports World was forced
to sell its interest in the six U.S. ports.
Today, sensational reports in tabloids, TV, and radio can quickly build
heat around a particular takeover transaction from a Chinese company.
Western politicians worried about their public image are naturally afraid of
being accused by the media of selling invaluable domestic assets to the
Chinese or of failing to protect national interests. For this reason,
politicians can be reluctant to defend Chinese foreign investments and are
more prone to taking a hardline approach to placate angry voters.
More alarmingly, fear in such scenarios is contagious. Although each
of the various interest groups is working alone to advance their own
agendas, they share a unifying goal of amplifying public fear. Their
individual endeavors can therefore feed on each other, with the
consequence that their joint efforts become a formidable force for
disrupting foreign investment. Indeed, there exists a positive feedback loop
among various interest groups. Public fear about FDI incentivizes the
media to respond more strongly to negative news rather than positive news
of FDI, which further amplifies public fear. Private interest groups exploit
public fear about foreign investment and lobby for regulatory response. As
fear of FDI heightens, politicians take action to respond, as doing so can
increase their popularity, even if they do not have sufficient grounds to
respond. Tough regulatory responses, such as blockage of foreign
investment, produce sensational headlines. This results in a vicious cycle
by further contributing to fear about FDI.
IV. RESPONSE TO FEAR
When people are fearful, the government is likely to react, even if the
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Jonathan Weisman, Port Deal to Have Broader Review; Dubai Firm Sought U.S. Security
Probe, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2006, at A1.
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fears are baseless.163 Moreover, regulators themselves can be susceptible to
various cognitive biases and thus may overreact to risks. In the face of
uncertainty, regulators will often find it more attractive to take
precautionary measures to avoid blame. This is especially true when
people can easily imagine or visualize a “worst-case scenario,” as their
reactions are often based mostly on the badness and the vividness of the
outcome rather than on the probability of its occurrence.164 Better safe than
sorry. Consequently, governments tend to enthusiastically embrace the
Precautionary Principle. 165
There are many different forms of
Precautionary Principles. Precautionary Principle in its weak form means
that a lack of decisive evidence of harm should not be a ground for refusing
to regulate.166 Sunstein agrees that this is perfectly sensible.167 However,
he has severely criticized a strong version of the principle, which suggests
that regulation is required whenever there is a possible risk of harm.168 He
argues that such overreaction to risks can itself produce potential risks and
lead to significant loss for societies.169 As he eloquently argues: “The
Precautionary Principle turns out to be flawed, not because it is vague
(though it is), and not because it threatens to impede desirable economic
development (though it does), but because it is paralyzing, forbidding the
very steps that it requires.”170
Indeed, the influx of foreign investment from an emerging economy
such as China represents a novel situation for many Western regulators
with which they have never dealt before. Although some of these concerns
are reminiscent of the anxieties about Japanese FDI two decades ago, there
are also important distinguishing features. First, unlike Japan, China is the
only large economy that is not an ally of Europe or the United States.
Second, while China is an emerging power with a rapidly modernizing
economy, “it is also a state with nondemocratic values and an economy
with a high degree of leverage” and intervention from the state.171 Third,
“China has a negative track record in industrial and political espionage”
and a reputation as a proliferator “of sensitive technologies to rogue
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regimes.”172 When information about Chinese FDI is limited, Western
regulators tend to rely on intuition when thinking about the risks posed by
Chinese FDI. Fearing a “worst-case scenario” in which Chinese control of
domestic economies causes dire political and economic consequences, they
may be tempted to embrace a strong form of the Precautionary Principle.
As such, they appeal to the alarmist bias against China and take extreme
precautionary measures, as revealed in the two examples below—the U.S.
Congress’ hostile response to CNOOC’s attempted acquisition of Unocal
and the Commission’s increased antitrust scrutiny of Chinese SOEs’
acquisitions in Europe.
A. U.S. Response to Chinese FDI
As Graham and Marchick observe: “The debate over investments
from China is not the first time that anxiety and opposition have been
directed toward a single nation.”173 During World War I, the United States’
concern regarding German investment in the chemical industry prompted
the passage of the Trading with the Enemy Act in 1917, which provided the
President with the power to seize foreign-owned assets in the United States
in either time of declared war or in any “international emergency.”174 In
the 1970s, the influx of investment from the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries following a politically motivated oil embargo caused a
near panic among the American public and its policy makers.175 CFIUS
was consequently established to oversee foreign investment and placate
Congress’ concern.176 In the 1980s, the emergence of Japan as a large
direct investor in the United States caused consternation, which ultimately
propelled Congress to approve the Exon-Florio Amendment, the first body
of law to establish an investment review regime in the United States.177
1. The Legal Mechanism178
Under Exon-Florio, the President has the authority to block a foreign
acquisition if “there is credible evidence that leads the President to believe
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that the foreign interest exercising control might take action that threatens
to impair the national security,” and if other laws, excepting the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, “do not in the President’s
judgment provide adequate and appropriate authority for the President to
protect the national security in the matter before the President.”179 As such,
the passage of Exon-Florio made it possible for the federal government to
intervene in virtually any foreign acquisition in any industry for reasons of
“national security,” a nebulous term that Congress intentionally did not
define in the amendment.180
In the wake of the controversies over the CNOOC-Unocal and Dubai
Ports World deals, Congress passed the Foreign Investment and National
Security Act of 2007 (FINSA) on July 27, 2007, amending Exon-Florio.181
Among other things, FINSA increases congressional oversight throughout
the process by requiring CFIUS to adhere to a system of congressional
briefings and annual reporting.182 Upon completion of each investigation,
CFIUS must provide Congress with notice of the transaction, the actions
taken, and certifications of conclusion by CFIUS officials.183 Critics note
that the increased congressional reporting requirements, together with the
allowance of access to confidential information pertaining to foreign
investment by the Congress and state senators, may allow special interest
groups to gain influence and to politicize the FDI review process.184 As
observed by one commentator: “With increased congressional involvement
in the CFIUS review process, there is an increased likelihood of pressure
from both domestic competitors and target managers to propel, delay, or
prevent certain proposed foreign acquisitions.”185
Notably, the U.S. Congress has already taken an active interest in
Chinese FDI. In 2007, Congress created a bipartisan committee, the United
States–China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC),
specifically “to monitor, investigate, and report to Congress on the national
security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship”
between the United States and China.186 In 2012, the USCC published an
influential report specifically analyzing the economic and policy
implications of rising Chinese investment in the U.S. economy. While the
179
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report recognizes the welcome, though still modest, economic benefits of
Chinese FDI, it also warns that such benefits are counterbalanced by the
policy challenges tied to Chinese FDI.187 With the increased congressional
involvement with Chinese FDI, commentators note that the potential for a
Chinese acquisition to become highly politicized is significant.188 Indeed,
the public reaction, in conjunction with the fiercely negative Congressional
response to CNOOC’s bid for Unocal, offers a prime example of how
cognitive biases and emotions can be exploited by various interest groups
to interfere with the national security review process.
2. CNOOC’s Proposed Acquisition of Unocal
On June 23, 2005, CNOOC proposed a bid of $18.5 billion for
Unocal, a California-based oil and gas company with significant assets and
operations in Asia. CNOOC’s announcement immediately spurred a
heated debate among the public and touched off a firestorm in
Washington.189 Indeed, when CNOOC announced its bid for Unocal, the
timing could not have been worse. In 2005, the global demand for oil and
gas was at the highest level in history and the global excess capacity of oil
production was at the lowest level in the past decade.190 As the world’s oil
prices reached historic highs, gasoline prices steadily rose in the United
States.191 While such hikes can at least partially be explained by American
consumers’ increased demand for oil, American politicians attributed the
increase mostly to China’s rising energy demand. 192 Only two years
earlier, China surpassed Japan and became the world’s second largest oil
consumer, immediately after the United States.193 Therefore, for many
Americans, CNOOC’s proposed purchase of major U.S. energy resources
was akin to a hostile force “intruding on our territory and snatching away
that which was vital for our own long-term survival.” 194
These strong reactions show that the American public and U.S.

187

SZAMOSSZEGI, supra note 19, at ix.
David N. Fagan, The U.S. Regulatory and Institutional Framework for FDI, in 2 INVESTING IN
THE U.S.: A REFERENCE SERIES FOR CHINESE INVESTORS 17 (2009).
189
See, e.g., Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Chinese Case Puts Secretive Panel in Spotlight: US Vetting
of Foreign Takeovers is Hot Topic, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at 22.
190
H.R. Res. 344, 109th Cong. (2005).
191
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, A PRIMER ON GASOLINE PRICES (May 2006), available at http://www.neo.ne.
gov/reports/primerongasoline.pdf.
192
E DWARD S. S TEINFELD, P LAYING O UR G AME, W HY C HINA’S E CONOMIC R ISE D OESN’T
T HREATEN THE W EST 177 (2010).
193
Pablo Bustelo, China and Oil in the Asian Pacific Region: Rising Demand for Oil, 21 NEW
ENGLAND J. PUB. POL’Y 171, 172 (2007).
194
STEINFELD, supra note 192, at 178 (Steinfeld provides a detailed discussion of CNOOC’s
operation and its proposed acquisition of Unocal).
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politicians have suffered from “endowment effects,” an anomaly
originating in loss aversion. Because Unocal is a U.S. based company, the
American public and policymakers have a natural emotional attachment to
its domestic oil and gas assets. The adamant response from the regulators
shows that they were extremely confident about their judgment, which
seems to derive from a simple logic: (1) oil is a scarce commodity that is
indispensable to the effective and normal functioning of the U.S. economy;
(2) oil prices have been rising and the demand for oil is increasing in the
United States; (3) therefore it does not make sense to sell these domestic
resources to foreign companies. But such thinking misses two important
pieces of information. First, oil is a highly fungible commodity. There is
no doubt that oil is a scarce resource and that America needs to import
much oil. However, the oil market operates on a global scale and it matters
little where oil supplies originate.195 Fungibility also means that if certain
oil supplies are artificially channeled to one destination, other oil suppliers
will be redirected, filling any market that previously relied on the
channeled supplies. Indeed, energy experts point out that America’s
vulnerability to oil supply disruptions is primarily related to how much oil
it consumes, not where the oil it consumes happens to originate.196 Second,
the American public seems to have completely ignored the compensating
benefits of the transaction. CNOOC was, in fact, the higher of the two
bidders for Unocal, and Unocal’s shareholders would have been better off
financially if the deal had gone through.
In addition to loss aversion, affect heuristics also played an important
role in shaping the public reaction to the CNOOC bid. CNOOC is a
publicly listed company based in Hong Kong, and it is 70% owned by
China National Offshore Oil Company, one of the largest state-owned oil
companies in China. For many Americans, CNOOC is the commercial
face of the Chinese communist government. The CNOOC bid also
coincided with growing uneasiness in the United States over the rise of
China’s economic and political power, the large bilateral trade deficit with
China, rising concern about China’s manipulation of its currency, and
inadequate protection of intellectual property rights.197 As such, System 1
dominated public thought processes: instead of answering the question of
whether the CNOOC acquisition was good for America, the American
public took a shortcut, instead answering the question of whether it “liked”
the acquisition or even whether it “liked” China in general.
Availability heuristics further amplified people’s fear of a rising
195

BERNARD A. GELB, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22182, UNOCAL CORPORATION’S OIL AND GAS (2005).
Jerry Taylor, CNOOC Bid for Unocal No Threat to Energy Security, CATO INST. (July 19, 2005),
available at http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/cnooc-bid-unocal-no-threat-energy-security.
197
DICK K. NANTO, JAMES K. JACKSON, WAYNE M. MORRISON & LAWRENCE KUMINS, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL33093, CHINA AND THE CNOOC BID FOR UNOCAL: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2005).
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China. Immediately before the CNOOC bid, there had been at least two
headline transactions involving large Chinese companies’ takeovers in
America. 198 A few months before CNOOC’s announcement, Chinese
computer maker Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s legendary personal
computer business caused a stir among the U.S. public and American
politicians, many of whom expressed concern over the national security
implications of the deal. Lenovo’s footsteps were quickly followed by
Haier Group, one of China’s biggest consumer electronics companies, who
led a consortium investor group to acquire the Maytag Corporation, an
American appliance icon. Three high profile acquisitions occurring in such
a short period of time came as a shock to the American public, leaving
them with the impression that Chinese companies were ferociously
acquiring dazzling American corporate icons and, in the process, taking
over America.199 Indeed, given nominal oil prices at record levels, strong
anti-China sentiment in Washington, and recent high profile acquisitions
signifying China’s growing economic clout, CNOOC’s attempt to acquire
Unocal produced a “perfect storm” in Congress for a debate on the national
security implications of Chinese investment in the United States.
CNOOC was competing with American-owned Chevron, who had
already made an offer to acquire Unocal for $16.4 billion in cash and
stock.200 To supplant Chevron’s bid, CNOOC made a more attractive offer
of $18.5 billion, all in cash.201 Both Chevron and CNOOC hired lobbyists
to sway public opinion and political leaders. But Chevron had a “home
advantage” in its efforts in Washington. According to the Washington
Post, Chevron lined up a formidable team of heavyweights in Washington
to lobby against the CNOOC bid.202 Its main strategy was to convince
Unocal’s shareholders that CNOOC’s higher all-cash offer was not worth
the risk of an extensive regulatory and security review.203
198
David Barboza & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Chinese Oil Company Offers $18.5 Billion for Unocal,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/22/business/worldbusiness/
22WIRE-CNOOC.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
See Weisman, supra note 133 (Chevron’s team of heavyweights include: Wayne L. Berman, a
top fundraiser for President Bush whose wife is the White House social secretary; Drew Maloney, a
former legislative director of House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Tex.); Kenneth J. Kies, a
prominent tax lobbyist; former commerce secretary Mickey Kantor; Democratic trade experts Claude
G.B. Fontheim and Kenneth I. Levinson; and David M. Marchick, a senior trade official in the Clinton
administration who specializes in national security reviews by the high-level Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States).
203
David O’Reilly, Chevron’s Pitch, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2005, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/0,,SB112113139861482996,00.html (As announced by David O’Reilly, the then chairman and
chief executive officer of Chevron: “For Unocal shareholders, the most important issue is clear. It is a
choice between a definitive merger agreement with Chevron, which can close in the next four weeks,
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In addition to lobbying from Chevron, politicians in the United States
also used the CNOOC transaction as an opportunity to exploit people’s fear
of rising Chinese FDI in order to advance their own political agendas. On
June 24, 2005, Representative William Jefferson, together with forty fellow
members of Congress, sent a letter to Treasury Secretary John Snow.204 In
the letter, they characterized the transaction as a symbol of an aggressive
China taking over scarce energy resources, which would make it
“increasingly difficult for U.S.-based companies to compete for scarce
energy resources on the world market against China’s state-owned and/or
controlled energy companies.” 205 They asked that the transaction “be
reviewed immediately to investigate the implications of the acquisition of
U.S. energy companies and assets by CNOOC and other government
controlled Chinese energy companies.”206
On June 30, 2005, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 344.
Introduced by Congressman Richard Pombo, the resolution expressed the
concern that a Chinese state-owned energy company exercising control of
critical American energy infrastructure and energy production capacity
could threaten American national security. It called on the President to
make a thorough review if the deal went forward.207 On July 13, 2005, the
House Armed Services Committee held a hearing on the CNOOC
transaction. Jim Woolsey, a former Central Intelligence Agency Director,
declared “China is pursuing a national strategy of domination of the energy
markets and strategic dominance of the West Pacific.” 208 He called
CNOOC “an organ, effectively, of the world’s largest Communist
dictatorship,” which should be blocked from acquiring American assets.209
During the same hearing, Frank Gaffney Jr., President of the Center for
Security Policy, warned that the sale of Unocal Corp. to CNOOC “would
have adverse effects on the economic and national security interests of the
United States,” pointing to “the folly of abetting Communist China’s effort
to acquire more of the world’s relatively finite energy resources.”210

versus an uncertain and highly contingent proposal from CNOOC, which cannot be executed unless and
until Unocal shareholders reject the Chevron agreement, or Chevron opts out.”).
204
Letter to Treasury Secretary John W. Snow from Representative William J. Jefferson et al., 151
CON. REC. H5570-77 (daily ed. June 30, 2005).
205
Id. H5574.
206
Id.
207
H.R. Res. 344, 109th Cong. (2005).
208
Steve Lohr, Unocal Bid Denounced at Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/14/business/worldbusiness/14unocal.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1373
447060-/Q2cKsZf3kJ8xlYJvQ1JDg.
209
Id.
210
“CNOOCERED”: The Adverse National Security Implications of the Proposed Acquisition of
Unocal by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation: Hearing Before the House Armed Servs.
Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., President, Ctr. for Sec. Policy).
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On July 29, 2005, the Senate and House representatives agreed to
adopt the amendment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 authored by
Congressman Pombo. It required that the secretaries of energy, defense,
and homeland security conduct a study of China’s growing energy
requirements and the implications of “such growth on the political,
strategic, economic, or national security . . . of the United States.”211 The
Amendment prohibited CFIUS from concluding its national security review
of an “investment in the energy assets of a United States domestic
corporation by an entity owned or controlled by the government of the
People’s Republic of China” until after a period of 141 days.212 That meant
that CFIUS could not complete its review of a potential CNOOC-Unocal
transaction for 141 days, or fifty-one days longer than the maximum of
ninety days established under Exon-Florio. Notably, Chevron is located in
the congressional district represented by the chairman of the House
Committee on Resources, Richard Pombo, the very person introducing
H.R. 344 and proposing amendment of the energy bill. On August 2, 2005,
CNOOC withdrew its offer, ensuring Chevron’s success. In response to the
new law, CNOOC released a press release citing “unprecedented political
opposition . . . creating a level of uncertainty that present[ed] an
unacceptable risk to our ability to secure this transaction.”213
There is an overwhelming consensus among FDI and energy experts
that Congress overreacted to CNOOC’s bid. 214 The Congressional
Research Service reports that Unocal is an insignificant player in the U.S.
energy market, accounting for only 0.8% of U.S. production of crude oil,
condensate, and national gas liquids.215 If the CNOOC-Unocal deal had
gone through, the combined natural gas production would have amounted
to about 1% of U.S. consumption, and combined oil production would have
been equivalent to 0.3% of domestic U.S. consumption. 216 Given the
relatively small size of Unocal’s global oil and gas holdings, a CNOOC
acquisition would have had a negligible impact on global energy markets.
Moreover, the majority of Unocal’s reserves are located in Asia and are
already committed under long-term contracts to serve the Asian regions.217
211

Energy Policy Act, H.R. 6, 109th Cong. § 1837 (2005).
Id.
213
Press Release, CNOOC, CNOOC Limited to Withdraw Unocal Bid (Aug. 2, 2005).
214
See, e.g., JAMES A. DORN, CATO INST., U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE WAKE OF CNOOC
(2005); Edward M. Graham, No Reason to Block the Deal, 168 FAR E. ECON. REV. 25 (July 2005);
GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 43, at 128–36.
215
BERNARD A. GELB, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RS22182, UNOCAL CORPORATION’S OIL AND
GAS 2 (2005).
216
DICK K. NANTO, JAMES K. JACKSON, WAYNE M. MORRISON & LAWRENCE KUMINS, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL33093, CHINA AND THE CNOOC BID FOR UNOCAL: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 11 (2005).
217
Patrick Barta & Matt Pottinger, Why CNOOC May Not Be Such a Big Threat, WALL ST. J. (June
30, 2005), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB112007624176673219.
212
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In 2006, a study undertaken by the U.S. Department of Energy at the
request of Congressman Pombo also concluded that foreign investments by
China’s national oil companies pose no economic threat to the United
States.218
As noted earlier, oil is a fungible commodity and it matters little
where oil supplies originate. Therefore, if CNOOC acquired Unocal and
directly shipped oil to China, instead of buying it on the open market, the
United States would not be “crowded out”; the Unocal production would
simply replace other imports that would have gone to China otherwise.219
Since overall global supply would remain the same, the price of oil would
not be affected. CNOOC might absorb a financial loss by selling below
world price to Chinese customers, but there would be little impact on the
rest of the world.
There is also no indication that Unocal possessed any proprietary
technology that was not already available to CNOOC through private
vendors, contractors, and other sources. While Unocal’s knowledge of
deep water drilling off the Gulf of Mexico is of great value, spreading such
expertise could result in greater oil production worldwide, benefiting all
consumers. Furthermore, CNOOC was willing to relinquish the Gulf of
Mexico assets if that step would have secured U.S. approval of that
transaction.220 In fact, CNOOC had agreed not to divert Unocal’s U.S.
production of oil and gas to other markets and it planned to retain virtually
all of Unocal’s employees. 221 While there was also concern about
subsidized finance, that was not a sufficient legal reason to block
CNOOC’s acquisition. Indeed, U.S. officials have confirmed that CFIUS
remains focused on the national security implications of inward FDI.
Expanding the mandate to cover debates over investment subsidies would
take CFIUS into terrain far better covered by expertise in other agencies.222
Unfortunately, these facts were largely downplayed or ignored during
the policy debate about CNOOC’s bid. Instead, many U.S. Congress
members favored precautionary measures and adamantly opposed the
CNOOC-Unocal deal. What they may have failed to realize, however,
were the consequences potentially resulting from their actions—the
political and economic repercussions of blocking CNOOC’s acquisition.

218
ERICA S. DOWN & PETER C. EVANS, BROOKING INST., UNTANGLING CHINA’S QUEST FOR OIL
THROUGH STATE-BACKED FINANCIAL DEALS 154 (2006).
219
DORN, supra note 214.
220
Dennis K. Berman et al., China Still Has to Prove It Can Close the Deal, WALL ST. J., July 21,
2005, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB112190262333391544.html.
221
Press Release, CNOOC, Statement by FU Chengyu, Chairman and CEO of CNOOC Ltd. (June
24, 2005).
222
Gary Hufbauer et al., Investment Subsidies for Cross-Border M&A: Trends and Policy
Implications (U.S. Council Found., Occasional Paper No. 2, 2008).
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As the country with the largest outward investment in the world, the United
States has a strong interest in maintaining open markets and encouraging
open investment policies; blocking the CNOOC-Unocal transaction could
have led to protectionism and ultimately hurt U.S. interests. If the United
States prevents Chinese firms from acquiring U.S.-based companies such
as Unocal, the Chinese will look elsewhere—to friendly states such as
Canada as well as to rogue states such as Sudan and Iran.223 This could
actually lead to a worse outcome than what most opponents were worried
about in the first place.
Another important aspect that tends to be ignored by U.S. regulators is
the benefits of globalization. One of the major benefits of Chinese FDI is
that the Chinese firms’ venture overseas could help them to learn Western
games (i.e., the rules in Western institutions).224 This is particularly true
for Chinese SOEs, who have enjoyed advanced and superior status in
China and are shielded from competition and regulations. However, once
they venture overseas, they will need to play the same games as their
Western counterparts: they will not only need to comply with local laws
and regulations but will also be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts
and litigation. The exposure to foreign regulations could create a positive
feedback effect into China, pushing the Chinese government to realize its
current legal and administrative system may be hindering the chances of
these companies operating successfully overseas.225
In fact, the increasing Chinese investment in the United States should
be viewed as “a hopeful sign” for the future of Chinese–American
relationships. As commented by Judge Posner: “[The CNOOC acquisition]
suggests that China envisages [a] peaceful, constructive commercial
relationship with the United States. Otherwise it would not spend billions
of dollars to acquire assets that ultimately are under the control of our
government.”226 Indeed, empirical research has shown that trade has the
benefit of reducing the probability of conflict between nations.227 The
more assets China invests in the United States, the more the U.S.
government can hold these assets as hostages against China. The United
States is one of the largest foreign investors in the Chinese market.
Recently Chinese regulators have brought a number of tough regulatory

223

DORN, supra note 214.
See generally STEINFELD, supra note 192.
225
Danil H. Rosen & Thilo Hanemann, The Rise in Chinese Overseas Investment and What It Means
for American Business, CHINA BUS. REV., July 1, 2012, available at http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/
the-rise-in-chinese-overseas-investment-and-what-it-means-for-american-businesses/.
226
Richard A. Posner, Posner’s Comment on Chinese Purchases of American Companies, BECKERPOSNER BLOG (Aug. 7, 2005), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2005/08/posners-comment-on-chinesepurchases-of-american-companies/comments/page/2/.
227
Solomon W. Polocheck, Conflict and Trade, 24 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 55 (1980).
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sanctions against foreign companies for corruption and antitrust
violations.228 Foreign companies have complained that they have been
unfairly targeted.229 But the more Chinese companies invest overseas, the
more Chinese assets will be subject to regulatory control by Western
regulators. This in turn could impose constraints on Chinese regulators (if
their actions have indeed unfairly targeted foreign firms), thus reducing
friction between the two countries. In cases of national emergency, such as
a military conflict, the U.S. government could even nationalize Chinese
assets. For example, after the outbreak of the Second World War,
subsidiaries of German companies operated in the United States were cut
off from their parent companies in Germany.230 These German subsidiaries
operated in the United States came under U.S. control, and there is no
evidence that they attempted to act in the interests of Germany against the
United States.231
B. European Response to Chinese FDI
The EU’s response to foreign takeovers has largely been dominated by
the drive to create a single internal market. The 1957 Treaty of Rome
called for members to “progressively abolish between themselves all
restrictions on the movement of capital belonging to persons resident in
Member States.” 232 In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty further expanded
Europe’s achievements on internal freedom of capital movements to third
countries.233 Article 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) stipulates that “all restrictions on the movement of capital
between Member States and between Member States and third countries
shall be prohibited.” 234 The legal framework allows very limited
exceptions, thus leaving EU member states with the most liberal economies
among developed countries in the regulation of FDI.235

228
Michael Martina & Kazunori Takada, Rattled by Investigations, Foreign Firms in China Beef
Up Compliance, REUTERS, Sep. 2, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/02/uschina-investigations-idUSBRE9810NG20130902.
229
Victoria Ruan, EU Group Wants Fairer Policies for Foreign Firms, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept.
6, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1304205/eu-group-wants-fairer-policies-foreign-firms.
230
See GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 17, at 102.
231
Id.
232
Treaty of Establishing the European Economic Community ch. 4, art. 67, Mar. 25, 1957, 4300
U.N.T.S. 294.
233
Treaty on European Union art. 73(b), Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1.
234
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 63, May 9,
2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 70 [hereinafter TFEU].
235
THILO HANEMANN & DANIEL H. ROSEN, RHODIUM GRP., CHINA INVESTS IN EUROPE:
PATTERNS, IMPACTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 64–65 (2012).
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1. The Legal Mechanism
Currently there is no foreign investment control at the EU level. But
such investment control may exist at the national level. Pursuant to the
TFEU, EU member states retain the right to impose restrictions on foreign
investment based on public security considerations, as long as those
restrictions do not result in arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade. 236 The EU law does not define national security
clearly, leaving the door open to broad interpretation. 237 Indeed,
investment security regimes at the member state level vary widely across
Europe. Countries such as France and Germany have established
investment reviews that are used to address security concerns, whereas
those like Belgium, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, and the
Netherlands do not have any investment measures related to public order
and essential security considerations.238
As EU member states have a mandate to protect the single market, the
Commission has been closely monitoring restrictions imposed by member
states on capital movements. As observed by Hanemann & Rosen: “Cases
involving economic nationalism against foreign takeovers of local
companies . . . were typically met with an ultimatum for compliance and a
filing with the European Court of Justice . . . .” 239 For instance, the
European Union Merger Regulation (EUMR) recognizes that member
states may take appropriate measures to protect certain “legitimate
interests” such as public security, plurality of the media, and prudential
rules.240 In practice, however, the Commission has narrowly interpreted the
scope of these “legitimate interests.”241 In fact, member states have rarely

236

TFEU, supra note 234, art. 346.
See generally OECD, PROPORTIONALITY OF SECURITY-RELATED INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS:
A SURVEY OF PRACTICES (2008), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/40699890.pdf; see
also OECD, TRANSPARENCY AND PREDICTABILITY FOR INVESTMENT POLICIES ADDRESSING NATIONAL
SECURITY CONCERNS: A SURVEY OF PRACTICES (2008), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentpolicy/40700254.pdf.
238
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-320, FOREIGN INVESTMENT: LAWS AND
POLICIES REGULATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN TEN COUNTRIES (2008); OECD, IDENTIFICATION OF
FOREIGN INVESTORS: A FACT FINDING SURVEY OF INVESTMENT REVIEW PROCEDURES (2010),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/3/45425060.pdf; Robert LaRussa & Lisa Raisner, Foreign Investment
Review: Mergers National Interest & National Security in 26 Jurisdictions Worldwide, in GETTING THE
DEAL THROUGH—FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW 2013 (2013).
239
HANEMANN & ROSEN, supra note 73, at 65.
240
See Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 Jan. 2004 on the Control of Concentrations
Between Undertakings, art. 21(4), 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1 [hereinafter EUMR].
241
See, e.g., Case IV/M.1616, BSCH/Champalimaud, Regulation (EC) No. 4064/89 (July 20, 1999);
Commission Press Release IP/00/1338 of November 22, 2000; Commission Press Release IP/06/1265
of September 26, 2006.
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been successful in blocking foreign acquisitions on “legitimate interests”
grounds.242
2. Recent Chinese SOEs’ Acquisitions in Europe
In general, Europe is perceived as a more welcoming destination for
Chinese investment than the United States. This has partly contributed to
the surge of capital influx into the EU in recent years, especially after the
financial crisis. The Rhodium Group estimated that in 2011, FDI from
China tripled from $3 billion to $10 billion, whereas inflows to the United
States remained unchanged at $5 billion.243 Such a large influx of capital
into Europe has alarmed European regulators, leading to “a fear of
politically and strategically motivated takeovers executed by Chinese
SOEs.” 244 In 2010, Xinmao, a Chinese cable maker, proposed an
acquisition of Draka, a Dutch fiber cable producer. This prompted
European Commissioner for Industry and Entrepreneurship Antonio Tajani
to call for a EU-wide foreign investment review to protect European knowhow and technology from Chinese investors.245 Tajani and his colleague
Michael Barnier later wrote to EU President José Manuel Barroso
emphasizing the need for a pan-European investment review regime: “[W]e
have to make sure it’s not a front for something else, in terms of taking our
know-how abroad . . . .”246 As he stated below: “The time to fireproof your
house is before it catches fire . . . we want to be sure we know who is
investing in Europe, and why.”247 Echoing such concerns, the European
Parliament called for a European body “entrusted with the ex ante
evaluation of foreign strategic investment.”248 Politicians in Europe have
further expressed concern that the current patchwork of investment rules in
different EU member states risks a race to the bottom in which some
member state authorities may abandon attempts to screen for security in the

242
See, e.g., Case IV/M.567, Lyonnaise des Eaux SA/Northumbrian Water Group, Regulation
(EEC) No. 4064/89 (Mar. 29, 1995); Case IV/M.759, Sun Alliance/Royal Insurance, Regulation (EC)
No. 4064/89 (June 18, 1996). See also RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW 852–53
(7th ed. 2012).
243
HANEMANN & ROSEN, supra note 73, at 36.
244
See John W. Miller, Chinese Companies Embark on Shopping Spree in Europe, WALL ST. J.
(June 6, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704355304576214683640225122; see
also Maaike Okano-Heijmans & Frans-Paul van der Putten, Europe Needs to Screen Chinese Investment,
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2009).
245
See Miller, supra note 244 (citing interview with Industry Commissioner Tajani).
246
John W. Miller, Bid Dropped as EU Raises China’s Wall, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704415104576065313773996124.html.
247
Miller, supra note 244.
248
Resolution on “EU and China: Unbalanced Trade?”, EUR. PARL. DOC. P7_TA 0218 (2012).
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rush to attract Chinese money.249
Some scholars suggest that there are two ways to overcome this
problem. The first is to create a EU-wide body, similar to CFIUS, to vet
foreign investment.250 However, this is likely to be met with significant
opposition from member states, who may have conflicting political and
economic interests and thus be reluctant to cede jurisdiction to a EU-wide
body. An alternative avenue for response is to strengthen the monitoring of
Chinese FDI on grounds of competition policy.251 This appears to be a
more feasible approach since the Commission is already empowered to
review cases at the EU level. Indeed, this seems to be exactly what has
happened recently.
Since 2011, acquisitions by Chinese SOEs in Europe have been
subject to heightened merger review by the Commission. In each of the
recently notified cases involving Chinese SOEs, the Commission has
considered the “worst-case scenario.” That is, operating on the hypothetical
assumption that all Chinese SOEs are controlled by the Chinese government
and thus should be treated as a single entity, the Commission has
considered whether a given transaction will pose any anti-competitive
harm.252
This “worst-case scenario” approach has introduced significant
complications for transactions involving Chinese SOEs. From a procedural
standpoint, if all Chinese SOEs are deemed part of the same entity, then
presumably the turnover requirement under the EUMR will surely be met
for the Chinese party, which would significantly increase the likelihood
that a Chinese acquisition would need to be notified to the Commission. In
fact, under the “worst-case scenario” considered by the Commission, any
acquisition involving any Chinese SOE would definitely require
notification to the Commission, as long as the European target’s turnover
also meets EU thresholds. From a substantive standpoint, if all Chinese
SOEs are treated as part of a single entity, then competitive assessments
would focus on the target and all the Chinese SOEs in the same sector,
249

See Meunier, supra note 59; see also GODEMENT, PARELLO-PLESNER & RICHARD, supra note 60.
See Meunier, supra note 59; see also GODEMENT, PARELLO-PLESNER & RICHARD, supra note 60.
251
See Meunier, supra note 59; see also GODEMENT, PARELLO-PLESNER & RICHARD, supra note 60.
252
See, e.g., Case COMP/M.6111, Huaneng/Intergen, Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (Feb. 2,
2011); Case COMP/M.6082, China National Bluestar/Elkem, Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (Mar. 31,
2011); Case COMP/M.6151, Petrochina/Ineos, Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (May 13, 2011); Case
COMP/M.6113, DSM/Sinochem/JV, Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (May 19, 2011); Case
COMP/M.6141, China National Agrochemical/Makhteshim Agan, Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (Oct.
3, 2011); Case COMP/M.6235, Honeywell/Sinochem/JV, Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (Dec. 2,
2011); Case COMP/M.6700, Talisman/ Sinopec/JV, Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (Oct. 16, 2012);
Case COMP/M.6715, CNOOC/NEXEN, Regulation (EEC) No. 139/2004 (Nov. 12, 2012); Case
COMP/M.6807, Mercuria Energy Asset Management/Sinomart KTS Development/Vesta Terminals,
Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (Mar. 7, 2013).
250
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rather than the target and the acquiring Chinese SOE alone, which could
adversely affect transactions.
So far the Commission has unconditionally cleared all the notified
cases involving Chinese SOEs because even under the “worst-case
scenario,” these transactions would not pose any anti-competitive harm.
Therefore, the Commission left open this issue of whether Chinese SOEs
should be viewed as a single entity in all its published decisions up to date.
However, the Commission continued to apply the “worst-case scenario”
approach to each notified transaction involving Chinese SOEs, and indeed
has taken jurisdiction over at least one case where the turnover of the
notifying Chinese SOE clearly did not meet the EU merger notification
thresholds.253 Thus even though the Commission has not openly taken a
position on the independence of Chinese SOEs, its review practice to date
indicates that it has tacitly reached a conclusion that Chinese SOEs are not
independent from each other and should be viewed as a single entity.
It is understandable that the Commission would want to exercise
caution in dealing with Chinese FDI, but the “worst-case scenario”
approach is precisely the kind of paralyzing precautionary measure that
could itself inflict cost and create risks. To begin, the “worst-case scenario”
approach significantly increases the regulatory risks and burdens for the
transacting parties, which could have the effect of deterring Chinese
investors. As the Commission has yet to reach an official conclusion on
this issue, transacting parties are left with no guidance as to whether they
need to notify their transactions to the Commission when their acquiring
Chinese SOE’s turnover does not satisfy the EU thresholds. Moreover,
once a transaction has been notified, the Commission usually requires the
parties to gather market data for all other Chinese SOEs in the same
sector—a mission nearly impossible since Chinese SOEs are presumed to
be independent. Indeed, unless the other relevant SOEs voluntarily
disclose their data, it is almost impossible for the parties to obtain such
information.
A more vexing issue is that the single entity theory is a double-edged
sword. If Chinese SOEs in the same sector are treated as part of a single
entity, agreements as well as mergers between them would arguably be
exempted from EU competition law.254 Therefore, applying the “worstcase scenario” approach to Chinese SOEs is very costly—the Commission
risks creating a precedent that will work against itself in the future when it
wants to exercise jurisdiction over mergers or cartels between Chinese
SOEs. The EU has a potential interest in intervening in those cases

253
This is based on the observation of a European competition lawyer representing a Chinese SOE
in connection with its acquisition in Europe. The lawyer wishes to stay anonymous.
254
See Zhang, supra note 23, at 824–26.
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because Chinese SOEs have access to European markets either via their
affiliates based in Europe or via exports. In the United States, there have been
at least three class action suits against Chinese companies for conducting
export cartels.255 In March 2013, Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. and its
affiliate company North China Pharmaceutical Group Co. were found
liable for fixing export prices on vitamin C in the United States and were
ordered to pay $162 million in damages.256 Similarly, although mergers
between Chinese SOEs take place in China, they will potentially have
effects on European markets as long as they make sales in Europe. But if
the Commission treats all Chinese SOEs as part of a single entity, then it
will presumably lose jurisdiction over these important mergers.
Moreover, the current approach adopted by the Commission may
jeopardize the EU’s hard-earned reputation as an open environment for
foreign investment. Indeed, the Commission risks the appearance of
applying a double standard to Chinese SOEs, as it has not explained in its
decision why it has not applied the same evidentiary standard in cases
involving Chinese SOEs and cases involving European SOEs. 257
Practitioners have already raised concerns as to whether the Commission
has been influenced by political factors in reviewing cases involving
Chinese firms.258 This could tarnish the reputation of the EUMR, a body of
antitrust law that should be firmly grounded in economics rather than
political concerns.259
So why did the Commission fail to see the adverse consequences that
255
In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 522 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); Resco Prods., Inc. v.
Bosai Minerals Grp., No. 06-235, 2010 WL 2331069 (W.D. Pa. June 4, 2010); Animal Sci. Prods., Inc.
v. China Nat’l Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 320 (D.N.J. 2010), vacated sub
nom. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011); see also
Dingding Tina Wang, When Antitrust Met WTO: Why U.S. Courts Should Consider U.S.-China WTO
Disputes in Deciding Antitrust Cases Involving Chinese Exports, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1096 (2012). It
should be noted that these cases only involve Chinese companies that are privately owned.
256
In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation [Animal Science Products, Inc., et al. v. Hebei Welcome
Pharm. Co. Ltd., et al.], No. 06-md-1738, No. 05-cv-0453 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2013).
257
See Zhang, supra note 23, at 822–24, 830 (“[C]ontrary to the principle under the EUMR and
previous Commission cases involving European SOEs, the Commission has seemed to focus on
whether the Chinese State is able to exert influence over the SOEs, rather than whether such influence
has been exerted in practice.”).
258
See, e.g., Odd Stemsrud, “China Inc” Under Merger Regulation Review: The Commission’s
Approach to Acquisitions by Chinese Public Undertakings, 32 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 481,
486 (2011) (“The practical approach of the Commission to undertake an entire “China Inc” alternative
assessment could also be viewed in light of the de lege ferenda view of Vice President Tajani, that the
Commission needs additional powers to investigate Chinese investments in the EU. In this political
environment it is, perhaps, understandable that DG COMP applies the old warning: “Approach with
caution.”).
259
Some scholars in Europe have held a contrary view that the EU competition law has and should
include other public policy objectives. See generally CHRISTOPHER TOWNLEY, ARTICLE 81 EC AND
PUBLIC POLICY (2009).
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could result from its “worst-case scenario” approach? This Article posits
that cognitive biases have led them astray. Because the consequences of a
communist Chinese state controlling the Western economy are cognitively
available and highly salient, strong emotions are triggered in European
publics and regulators and fear of Chinese FDI is heightened. When people
have a strong negative affect toward Chinese FDI, they tend not to think
much about the probability of harm but focus instead on possible disastrous
consequences. As such, European regulators have reacted with extreme
caution in dealing with Chinese investment and have focused on “worstcase scenarios”—a salient manifestation of alarmist bias. In fact, European
regulators themselves have influenced public perception of the risks
associated with Chinese FDI. As evidenced by Antonio Tajani’s warning
about the potential dire consequences of Chinese investment in Europe,
regulators can themselves act as availability entrepreneurs and further
amplify European fear of Chinese FDI. Moreover, when the Commission
forms the belief that a Chinese SOE has no independent power of decisionmaking, it tends to seek evidence supporting such a thesis rather than
evidence challenging it. To make matters worse, alarmist bias and
confirmation bias are worsened by inadequate checks and balances in the
EU competition regime.
Wouter Wils, a leading scholar on EU
competition law, has long observed that antitrust regulators are susceptible
to prosecutorial biases and that this problem is particularly acute for the
Commission as it combines the prosecutorial function with the adjunctive
function.260
But how likely is it that the Chinese government still continues to
control the decision-making of Chinese SOEs? The Commission’s analysis
is silent on this point. Indeed, if there is a one percent chance that the
Chinese government maintains close control of the decision-making of the
SOEs, the action taken by the Commission should differ from a scenario in
which there is a ninety-nine percent chance that it does. To resolve this
issue, the Commission needs to take a step back and re-examine the
historical and contemporary dynamics of SOE governance in China.
Thirty years ago, few would have doubted that the whole Chinese
economy was one big firm, and that none of the Chinese SOEs possessed
independent power of decision-making. But China has made great strides
in reforming its SOE system. In the 1990s, the Chinese government
privatized a large number of small and medium size SOEs and conducted
extensive restructuring of the remaining larger SOEs. 261 In 2003, the

260

See WOUTER P. J. WILS, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 164–65 (2005).
See OECD, OECD REVIEWS OF REGULATORY REFORM: CHINA—DEFINING THE BOUNDARY
BETWEEN THE MARKET AND THE STATE (2009) [hereinafter OECD, OECD REVIEWS OF REGULATORY
REFORM], http://www.oecd.org/china/42390089.pdf.
261
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Chinese government created the State Asset Supervision and
Administration Commission (SASAC), a special commission directly
subordinate to the State Council, to act as a fiduciary to manage its
ownership interests.262 One of the primary objectives in establishing the
SASAC was to “separate the government’s social and public management
functions from the role as the investor of the state-owned assets in terms of
institutional framework.”263 Pursuant to the Enterprise State-Owned Assets
Law promulgated in 2008, SASAC is entitled to rights as a shareholder,
including returns on its investment and approval of any major ownership
decisions such as mergers, bankruptcy, and the issuance of new securities
of the firm.264 In addition, SASAC has the authority to appoint directors,
managers, and supervisors of wholly SOEs, and to nominate directors and
supervisors in partially state-owned enterprises.265 Besides the exercise of
such rights, SASAC is not allowed to intervene directly in management or
day-to-day operations.266 Thus it appears that Chinese SOEs enjoy a power
of decision-making independent of SASAC, which essentially exercises
basic ownership functions on behalf of the Chinese government as a nonmanaging trustee.
On the other hand, there are also good reasons for the Commission to
be skeptical about Chinese SOEs. While the creation of the SASAC has
weakened the administrative ties between SOEs and government agencies,
the ties have not been completely severed. In particular, the CCP—the
single ruling party in China—is omnipresent at all levels of the government
and the national economy and still exercises influence over Chinese SOEs
through the Soviet-style nomenklatura system.
As a result, the
appointments of senior executives at Chinese SOEs, as well as the future
career paths of the top SOE executives, are determined by the CCP, which
gives incentives to SOE executives to follow the government’s policy
guidance.267 However, due to the secretive nature of the CCP, it is not
exactly clear to what extent it still influences the decision-making of senior
executives at Chinese SOEs. This poses significant challenges to the staff
at the merger unit of the Commission, who are antitrust law experts but
262
See China State-Owned Asset Management System Reform Entering New Stage, SASAC (May
23, 2003), http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n2964727/n2974401/2976097.html.
263
Id. For a detailed discussion on SASAC as a controlling shareholder of Chinese SOEs, see Lin
& Milhaupt, supra note 22, at 734–46.
264
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guoyou Qiye Zichan Fa (中华人民共和国国有企业资产法)
[The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises] (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2008, effective May 1, 2009) arts. 12, 16, 18, 21,
30–38 (China).
265
See id. art. 22.
266
See id. arts. 6, 14.
267
Nan Lin, Capitalism in China: A Centrally Managed Capitalism (CMC) and Its Future, 7
MGM’T & ORG. REV. 63 (2010); see also Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 22, at 738–39.
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may not necessarily understand the corporate governance of SOEs
operating in a transitional economy like China.
To be sure, this Article does not argue that the Commission should
just sit back and do nothing. Given the opaque governance structure of
Chinese SOEs, it is perfectly understandable for European regulators to be
vigilant about the potential risks of Chinese SOEs’ investment in Europe.
But prior to adopting any precautionary measures, European regulators
should conduct careful cost and benefit analysis to study the consequences
of their regulatory actions. Importantly, when evidence is speculative and
the regulatory cost is high, regulators should consider whether there are any
less intrusive measures to mitigate the risks. Under the current European
legal framework, a more pragmatic approach seems to involve treating
Chinese SOEs as independent under EUMR and dealing with any potential
economic and political risks under the national security review regimes that
exist at the member state level. This, however, is not an ideal position for
the Commission as it could have interests in conflict with those of
individual member states. Europe is now confronted with a thorny issue:
should member states be left with the exclusive power to regulate FDI
under national security regimes or should the Commission be empowered
to do so as well? Whatever Europe decides in the future, it must ensure
that its antitrust review is not swayed by political considerations.
V. WHO IS DRIVING CHINESE FDI?
When information about Chinese FDI is limited, people tend to rely
on intuition and feelings in making judgments. In particular, associative
memory, the core of System 1, will try to construct a coherent
interpretation of the motivation of Chinese FDI. People can feel very
confident about their judgment, without realizing that it is in fact based on
inadequate evidence. Ironically, knowing little about China may actually
make it easier for people to fit everything they know into a coherent
pattern. The story is simple: (1) most Chinese FDI is made by companies
owned by the Chinese government; (2) the Chinese government actively
encourages Chinese SOEs to venture overseas to make foreign investment;
and (3) therefore Western governments should be vigilant, as such
investments could be “Trojan horses” of the Chinese government.
As a consequence, the public debate on foreign investment from China
becomes deeply imbalanced. Most analysis of Chinese FDI policy has
placed the central government in the driver’s seat. The typical worries are
that Chinese SOEs looking for expansion opportunities overseas are not
pure market players but are simply puppets that respond to the policies and
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instructions of the Chinese government. 268 But appearances can be
deceptive. The Chinese economy, as China expert Yasheng Huang acutely
observes, “is so complicated that what appears to be straightforward and
obvious on the surface is not at all so once we dig into the details.”269
Indeed, what the Western news reports and policy debate often fail to
address is that the rapid increase of Chinese FDI is in fact predicated on a
number of institutional distortions in the Chinese economy. Crucially, they
ignore or downplay that agency problems, particularly empire building
incentives, exist at the Chinese SOE level. Yet these incentives are one of
the most important factors powering the surge of Chinese FDI. It would be
difficult to estimate the exact amount these empire building incentives have
factored in Chinese FDI, but a close study of outbound investment made in
the oil and gas sector reveals that agency problems are pervasive and weigh
heavily on the investment decisions of Chinese national oil companies
(NOCs).
A. Empire-Building Incentives
Empire building is a manifestation of agency problems existing in
firms. Due to the information asymmetry between shareholders and
management, the latter may retain private information about the firm and
not reveal it to the former. Conflict arises when management maximizes its
own interest at the expense of shareholders. Michael Jensen, a leading
scholar on corporate finance, has proposed a free cash flow theory
suggesting that management has perverse incentives to grow beyond
optimal size. 270 Instead of paying free cash flow to shareholders,
management has the incentive to spend free cash flow to fund
acquisitions—this not only increases the amount of resources under its
control, but can also increase its compensation (as compensation is
positively linked to the growth of a company). Free cash flow theory
therefore predicts that managers of firms with unused borrowing power and
large free cash flows are more likely to undertake low-benefit or even
value-destroying mergers. To prevent overinvestment, economists have
shown that external capital markets such as debt can serve the monitoring
role of disciplining managerial use of free cash flow.271

268

SZAMOSSZEGI, supra note 19, at ix.
YASHENG HUANG, CAPITALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND
THE STATE 2 (2008).
270
See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,
76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986) (Free cash flow refers to cash flow in excess of that required to fund all
projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital.).
271
Id.; see also René M. Stulz, Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies, 26 J. FIN.
ECON. 3 (1990).
269
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Jensen’s research on empire building has mainly focused on the
conflict between management and a diffuse group of shareholders. But
empire-building incentives loom even larger for management at SOEs.
Janos Kornai, a Hungarian economist, has long posited that SOEs are
afflicted with “investment hunger.” 272 Due to soft budget constraints,
SOEs operating in a socialist system do not need to bear the loss from
faulty investment decisions. Moreover, it is difficult to hold management
accountable since SOEs have many policy burdens, and profits cannot be
used as a sole evaluating factor. Indeed, research has shown that agency
costs associated with managerial empire building behavior are more severe
when corporate governance is weak273 and managers are less accountable to
their shareholders.274
SOEs in China have an insatiable desire to expand: the bigger it is, the
more powerful it becomes; the more powerful it is, the easier it becomes to
obtain financial resources for overseas expansion. It thus grows even
bigger and more powerful, resulting in a vicious cycle. Chinese firms are
vying to become leaders in their particular industries so that they will be
deemed indispensible to local and central governments. Such incentives
have been well documented in Yasheng Huang’s Selling China, an
excellent book about FDI into China.275 Huang finds that SOEs’ obsession
with technology drives them to partner with foreign multinational
companies to create joint ventures in China. As profits no longer serve as a
guiding criterion, SOEs like to use tangible inputs to showcase their
competitiveness.276 This leads to a destructive consequence: SOEs pile up
hard assets and the government allocates resources according to the
technological capabilities of the SOEs.277 Worryingly, Huang identifies
evidence that SOEs know how to accumulate assets but do not know how
to use them efficiently; he points out that Chinese SOEs are more interested
in spending money to acquire hard assets than in generating positive return
from their assets.278
Worse yet, distortions in China’s capital markets compound distortions
272
JANOS KORNAI, THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNISM 162 (1992)
(“Expansion drive is a fact of life for the bureaucracy. And because this system has only bureaucrats
and no real owners, there is almost total lack of internal, self-imposed restraint that might resist this
drive. The investment hunger is ubiquitous.”).
273
Pornsit Jiraporn, Yuong Sang Kim, Wallace N. Davidson & Manohar Singh, Corporate
Governance, Shareholder Rights and Firm Diversification: An Empirical Analysis, 30 J. BANK. & FIN.
947 (2006).
274
Ole-Kristian Hope & Wayne B. Thomas, Managerial Empire Building and Firm Disclosure, 46
J. ACCOUNT. RES. 591 (2008).
275
YASHENG HUANG, SELLING CHINA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DURING THE REFORM ERA 7 (2003).
276
Id. at 223–24.
277
Id.
278
Id. at 136–37.
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in managerial incentives. 279 China’s capital markets are dominated by
banks, especially the big four state-controlled banks. As China’s financial
system allocates resources according to a political rather than economic
pecking order of firms,280 inefficient SOEs enjoy a superior advantage in
obtaining funds for investment. As pointed out by Morck, Yeung, and
Zhao, China’s recent FDI surge is likely a manifestation of its inability to
reinvest efficiently its high corporate and individual savings.281
With superior access to financing, Chinese SOEs have been expanding
not only in the domains of their specific industries, but also investing
outside. Indeed, Chinese SOEs have been seen elbowing out private
domestic firms in competitive industries, especially those with high risk
and high return. This phenomenon has been known as “the state advances,
the private sector retreats.” The problem has been exacerbated by the
recent financial crisis, as the Chinese government loosened monetary
policies to increase bank lending and SOEs became the main benefactors of
the policy. For example, a government spokesperson recently admitted that
74% of the SOEs owned by the central government are engaged in the
highly profitable but risky real estate business and that these companies
also run about 2,500 hotels in the country.282 These SOEs face significant
public pressure and the official media has criticized them for “not doing
their proper business.”283 According to Xinhua News Agency, the Chinese
government recently ordered 78 companies to withdraw their investments
in the real estate sector.284
But an SOE’s overseas investment faces less public scrutiny and fewer
complaints from domestic competitors. In fact, takeovers of foreign firms
can bring enormous national pride and serve the purpose of image building
for the Chinese government. Moreover, managers of SOEs can use
overseas investment to demonstrate their skill at managing international
businesses, and thereby claim political credit for responding to the
government’s “going out” policy.285 As such, CEOs of central SOEs may
use their corporate careers as springboards into the national leadership.
Cheng Li, an expert on Chinese leadership, observes that “[the] younger,
business-savvy, politically connected and globally minded Chinese CEOs

279

Morck et al., supra note 70, at 344.
HUANG, supra note 275, at 66.
281
Morck et al., supra note 70, at 344; see also Ligang Song, Jidong Yang & Yongsheng Zhang,
State-Owned Enterprises’ Outward Investment and the Structural Reform in China, 19 CHINA &
WORLD ECON. 38, 44 (2011).
282
Cheng Li, China’s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012 (Part 4: Top Leaders of Major
State-Owned Enterprises), 34 CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 27 (2011).
283
Id.
284
Id.
285
Song, Yang & Zhang, supra note 281, at 39.
280
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have recently become a new source of the CCP leadership[,]” a
phenomenon he attributes largely to the meteoric rise and growing power
and influence of the SOEs. 286
There is another important reason why managers at Chinese SOEs are
anxious to grow their companies. Central SASAC, the supervisory
commission overseeing the central government’s interests in assets, has
been gradually reducing the number of SOEs under its control. When
SASAC was first established in 2003, it supervised 196 companies.287 This
number fell to 152 in 2007; 288 it currently only supervises 113
companies.289 According to SASAC head Li Rongrong, central SASAC
planned to reduce the number of central firms to well under 100 within the
next few years, so that only the more efficient firms would survive.290
According to Barry Naughton, a China expert, “This has touched off a
furious scramble to expand beyond the cutoff point, since any manager
who presides over a firm that doesn’t make it into the elite hundred would
lose his privileged rank and be perceived as a failure.”291
The agency problems at SOEs are further exacerbated by the lack of
financial disclosure. Financial economists have found that public financial
disclosure can serve as a means to lower the cost of monitoring a firm and
thus reduce agency problems.292 Empirical studies also show that when
disclosure quality reduces, managers can make suboptimal decisions such
as empire building that maximizes their own interest at the expense of the
firm.293 But the level of financial disclosure varies significantly among
Chinese SOEs. Since the early 1990s, the Chinese government has
initiated a process of corporatizing the SOEs and selling their minority
interests to private investors on both domestic and overseas stock
exchanges. 294 To fulfill the listing requirements, these publicly listed
Chinese SOEs will need to adopt modern corporate governance structures
and make mandatory disclosures of their finances. But the non-listed SOEs
are not subject to mandatory governance requirements, and very few of
them have adopted modern corporate governance structure.295 Carved out
286

Li, supra note 282, at 1.
Barry Naughton, SASAC and Rising Corporate Power in China, 24 CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR
2 (2008).
288
Id. at 6.
289
Yangqi Minglu, The List of Central State-Owned Enterprises, SASAC, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/
n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
290
Naughton, supra note 287, at 2.
291
Id.
292
Robert M. Bushman & Abbie J. Smith, Financial Accounting Information and Corporate
Governance, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 237 (2001).
293
Hope & Thomas, supra note 274, at 592.
294
OECD, OECD REVIEWS OF REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 261.
295
For a detailed discussion on the corporate governance issues of Chinese SOEs, see Donald C.
287
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of the ministries during early rounds of reform, these SOEs maintain strong
networks of bureaucrats and officials and shoulder the policy burdens of
the SOEs. Many of these companies are loss making296 and have little
incentive to provide financial disclosures. As a consequence, there is little
public information available about the outward investments they make,
thus providing them with the perfect camouflage for overexpansion.
Worryingly, this is precisely the reason that many Chinese SOEs prefer to
use a non-listed SOE (particularly the parent or the sister company of the
listed SOE) as the vehicle for making overseas acquisitions.297
Notably, Chinese outward investments are subject to investment
approvals from various government agencies when they exceed certain
thresholds.298 However, those bureaucratic approvals are unlikely to serve
as an effective check on the management decisions of powerful Chinese
SOEs, particularly those that are directly controlled by the central
government. Repeated administrative reforms and industrial overhauls,
which are part of the broader movement of China’s transition from a
planned to a market economy, have abolished most of the central
bureaucracies responsible for the regulated industries and transferred their
administrative, institutional, and personnel capacity as well as their
bureaucratic rank to central SOEs.299 Furthermore, many of the large SOEs
have gone listed and were able to raise funds overseas. These SOEs
usually structure their holding companies offshore in tax havens such as the
Cayman Islands or in Hong Kong and with subsidiaries incorporated in
China. The proceeds of the financing they obtain from public securities or
bond offerings may be held offshores and used for foreign acquisitions,
thus bypassing the regulations of the Chinese government.300 Using the oil
and gas sector as an example, the following part investigates the agency
problems of Chinese NOCs and provides a behavioral explanation of why
such problems tend to be neglected during policy debate about their
outbound acquisitions.

Clark, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview, 14 CHINA ECON. REV. 494 (2003).
296
See generally HONG SHENG & NONG ZHAO, CHINA’S STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: NATURE,
PERFORMANCE AND REFORM (2013).
297
MCGREGOR, supra note 13, at 59.
298
For a general discussion of the Chinese regulatory regime on outward FDI, see Yadong Luo,
Qiuzhi Xue & Binjie Han, How Emerging Market Governments Promote Outward FDI: Experience
from China, 45 J. WORLD BUS. 68 (2010).
299
See generally DALI YANG, REMAKING THE CHINESE LEVIATHAN: MARKET TRANSITION AND
THE POLITICS OF GOVERNANCE IN CHINA (2004).
300
See HOWARD CHAO & RUCHUN JI, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, OBTAINING FUNDING AND
APPROVAL FOR CHINESE OUTBOUND INVESTMENT 1 (2008).
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B. A Study of the Chinese Oil and Gas Sectors
Chinese SOEs in the oil and gas industry have been the most active in
making overseas investment. According to a study by Deloitte, the oil and
gas industry has dominated Chinese outbound merger and acquisition
(M&A) investments, accounting for 28% of the overall market by deal
volume from 2005 to the third quarter of 2012; they also made up 66% of
all Chinese outbound M&A investments in terms of value during the same
period, with a total of U.S. $187.3 billion spent.301 At the same time,
acquisitions by Chinese NOCs also tend to cause the most alarm in
Western countries—there is a perennial concern that “China will lock up
oil supplies and distort international oil markets to the detriment of other
economies.”302 Many Western observers believe that these Chinese NOCs
are in “a highly-coordinated quest for oil and natural gas assets,” one
designed by their political masters in Beijing. 303 This perception is
reinforced by a number of high profile visits in which Chinese leaders have
travelled with executives from China’s NOCs to oil-producing states in
order to sign agreements for energy cooperation with the host countries,
sometimes in conjunction with other investment, aid, and trade deals.304
All these facts seem to suggest a coherent story: the Chinese government is
driving the NOCs’ overseas forays. “What you see is all there is,” as
Kahneman says.305
But appearances can be deceptive and the story is far from complete.
Undoubtedly, Chinese NOCs are willing and capable of serving the
economic interests of the Chinese government when doing so is compatible
with their own interests. However, they have also shown reluctance to be
“puppets” of their principal.306 As revealed in the studies of two leading
experts on Chinese energy security, Erica Downs of the Brookings Institute
and Bo Kong of Johns Hopkins University, the liberalization of the Chinese
energy sector over the past two decades has resulted in a shift of power and
resources away from the central government and toward the NOCs.307 The
three major NOCs in China, including China National Petroleum
301
DELOITTE CHINA, THE RESURGENT DRAGON—SEARCHING FOR VALUE IN TROUBLED TIME 6
(2012), available at https://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Germany/Local%20Assets/Documents/03_
CountryServices/2012/CSG_China_Outbound_MuA_Report_2012_EN.PDF.
302
John Lee, China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil, 35 WASH. Q. 75, 85 (Summer 2012).
303
Erica S. Downs, The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations, 3 CHINA SEC. 42, 48
(July 28, 2007).
304
Id.
305
KAHNEMAN, supra note 37, at 85.
306
BO KONG, CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM POLICY 93–94 (David L. Goldwyn et al. eds.,
2010); see also Edward A. Cunningham, China’s Energy Governance, Perception and Reality, MIT
CTR. FOR INT’L STUD. SER. (March 2007), http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/ Audit_03_07_Cunningham.pdf.
307
KONG, supra note 306, at 1; Downs, supra note 303, at 49.
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Corporation (CNPC), China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), and
China National Offshore Oil Corporation, were all created from
government ministries in the 1980s. 308 Since the 1990s, repeated
administrative reforms and industrial overhauls in China’s petroleum sector
have abolished the central bureaucracies responsible for the petroleum
industry and transferred their administrative, institutional, and personnel
capacity as well as their bureaucratic rank to the NOCs.309 The “remaining
regulatory power over the petroleum industry at the central level continues
to be fragmented among different bureaucracies,” who often lack the clout
or staff necessary to regulate the petroleum industry.310 As a result, the
regulatory agencies often defer to the three NOCs over important policy
problems and increasingly have relied on them to identify policy problems,
formulate corresponding responses, and implement policies. 311 Kong
suggests that this asymmetric distribution of power over petroleum policy
between the government and the NOCs has resulted in “the latter
becom[ing] the driver of the country’s domestic and international
petroleum policy.”312 This is also echoed by Downs’ observation regarding
the investment decisions made by Chinese NOCs:
Beijing has certainly encouraged China’s NOCs to expand
internationally, provided them with varying levels of diplomatic
and financial support, and occasionally intervened in the
companies’ foreign investment decision-making. However,
when it comes to choosing where to invest, the companies are
almost always in the driver’s seat and the Chinese government,
while occasionally offering general advice about the direction
they should travel, . . . is often just along for the ride with little
idea of the final destination.313
Indeed, when assessing the motives of Chinese NOCs venturing
abroad, people tend to neglect the principal-agent relationship between the
Chinese government and the NOCs. Although the Chinese government
owns the NOCs, they do not run these companies and, instead, delegate
their authority to the NOCs. Conflicts therefore arise when the NOCs
pursue agendas that advance their own interests at the expense of those of
the Chinese government. For instance, many Chinese oil analysts and the
308
Erica Downs, Business Interest Groups in Chinese Politics: The Case of Oil Companies, BROOKINGS
INST. PRESS 122 (July 29, 2010).
309
KONG, supra note 306, at 144–45.
310
Id. at 145.
311
Id. at 2, 16.
312
Id. at 144–45.
313
Downs, supra note 303, at 48.
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government believe that “equity oil” enhances petroleum security as it
would give Chinese NOCs additional security in times of market
turbulence and supply disruption.314 Accordingly, Chinese NOCs have
been aggressively acquiring upstream assets abroad under the pretext of
enhancing energy security. Yet industry experts have pointed out that this
kind of arrangement is neither politically feasible nor political desirable in
cases of severe security crisis.315 As producing countries are often reluctant
to cede residual rights to foreign countries for economic and security
reasons, China’s foreign upstream investments typically involve limited
ownership rights.316 Moreover, Chinese “NOCs do not ship all their equity
oil back home, despite a degree of support from the Chinese
government.”317 According to China’s customs data, industry intelligence,
and news reports, “Chinese NOCs shipped back only one-third of their
overseas equity production and sold the remaining to the international
market” for profits.318
So what has motivated these NOCs to make overseas acquisitions,
since it is not at all clear whether they really enhance national security?
There are at least two important reasons. First, the big difference between
profit margins of the upstream sector and the downstream sector in China
has motivated NOCs to acquire more upstream assets abroad. Even though
the NOCs need to import oil at the international market price, the
downstream prices are often artificially suppressed by the Chinese
government. Due to worries about inflation and its political implications,
the central government still sets prices for downstream products such as
diesel and gasoline.319 Consequently, China’s NOCs have lost billions of
dollars in their refining and marketing sectors in recent years.320 This is a
particularly serious problem for Sinopec and CNPC because both
companies have significant downstream business. As a result, these
companies have constantly lobbied the Chinese government for subsidies in
order to compensate their losses. On several occasions, they even exported
their products to foreign markets in order to gain higher profits, resulting in
several rounds of severe artificial fuel shortage in China.321
314
See KONG, supra note 306, at 92 (Equity oil refers to “the proposition of crude production that a
concession owner has the legal and contractual right to retain or sell as a guarantee on investment under
the production-sharing agreements.”).
315
JOSEPH FRANCOIS, WALTRAUT URBAN & FRANZ WIRL, FIW, CHINA’S FOREIGN OIL POLICY:
GENESIS, DEPLOYMENT AND SELECTED EFFECTS (2010); see also Erica S. Downs, The Chinese Energy
Security Debate, 177 CHINA Q. 21, 35–36 (2004).
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The other important motivating factor is empire building. Like other
SOEs in China, the amount of the high-quality assets of a NOC determines
its political clout. As noted by Downs: “The more high-quality assets a
company acquires, the more likely it is to obtain diplomatic and financial
support from the Chinese government for its subsequent investments.”322
This explains the lack of coordination among Chinese NOCs in their race
for overseas expansion. Indeed, they have reportedly criticized each
other’s foreign investments to third parties both inside and outside the
Chinese government. 323 According to one Chinese consulting firm,
“CNOOC’s real enemies are China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) and
Sinopec. The little brother . . . has to have more assets to have a louder
voice.”324 Indeed, the ultimate holding companies of CNPC and Sinopec
are both ministry-level companies, whereas the holding company of
CNOOC has only the lower status of a general bureau. “Bureaucratic
ranks,” of course, “are very important in China because negotiations are
conducted among bureaucracies of equal rank, and only high-rank
bureaucracies can issue orders to low-rank bureaucracies.”325 As CNOOC
competes at a political and economic disadvantage with the other two big
NOCs, it is most pressured to pursue overseas expansion.
Such agency problems are further exacerbated by lack of disclosure by
Chinese NOCs. It has been observed that CNPC and Sinopec have both
preferred to use the holding company of the listed company to take the lead
in international mergers and acquisitions.326 Since the Chinese government
wholly owns the holding company, it is not subject to public disclosure
requirements, nor is it constrained by public shareholders or independent
board members from undertaking risky projects. It is thus no surprise that
both CNPC and Sinopec have preferred to use these non-listed companies
to make substantial investments in countries where there are high political
risks.327 In comparison, CNOOC has only made overseas acquisitions via
its listed subsidiary. 328 But this fact seems to have less to do with
CNOOC’s incentives to be more transparent than with the restriction
CNOOC imposed upon itself when it was seeking to get listed in Hong
322

Downs, supra note 303, at 50.
Id.
324
Neil Gough, Eric Ng & Mark O’ Neil, CNOOC Gains Tactical Edge from Battle, S. CHINA
MORNING POST (Aug. 4, 2005), http://www.scmp.com/article/510850/cnooc-gains-tactical-edge-battle;
see also STEINFELD, supra note 192, at 202 (discussing the incentives for CNOOC to outperform CNPC
and Sinopec).
325
KONG, supra note 306, at 16.
326
Erica S. Downs, China’s NOCs: Lessons Learned from Adventures Abroad, BROOKINGS INST.
PRESS 27 (July 2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2008/7/
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Kong in 2001. 329 In order to increase attractiveness to international
investors, CNOOC entered into a non-compete agreement with its parent
company, which prohibits the parent company from engaging in the more
profitable upstream activities.330 As a result, only the listed CNOOC can
make overseas acquisitions of upstream assets. In fact, CNOOC has
attributed its unsuccessful bid for Unocal partly to the delay it encountered
in garnering support from skeptical independent shareholders. 331 It
thereafter attempted unsuccessfully to amend the non-compete agreement
to allow only its parent company to engage in upstream activities.332
This leads to a puzzle: if the empire-building incentives of SOEs have been
so well documented in economic literature and there have been abundant
examples of Chinese SOEs using free cash flow to pursue risky
investments, why are these agency problems seldom mentioned by the
Western media or regulators during policy debates? This Article posits that
at least three reasons account for such an anomaly. First, the Western
public and regulators tend to take mental shortcuts when making judgments
about Chinese FDI. They tend to focus on facts that are on screen. Starting
from the premise that Chinese SOEs are “owned” by the Chinese
government, they jump to the conclusion that these SOEs are also
“controlled” by the Chinese government and, moreover that the communist
state is lurking behind their operations and management. At the same time,
they tend to ignore the facts that are off screen—the principal-agent
relationship between the Chinese government and the SOEs whereby the
latter may maximize their own interests at the expense of the former.
Second, once the public, the media, and regulators form the belief that
Chinese SOEs are mere puppets of the Chinese government, they tend to
proactively seek evidence that confirms this belief, while ignoring evidence
that challenges or discredits it. Accordingly, studies on the agency
problems of Chinese SOEs tend to be downplayed or ignored during media
discussions and policy debates. Third, well-organized entities including
private interest groups, the media, and the government can endogenously
generate fear of Chinese FDI in order to advance their own agendas, thus
further tipping the policy debate on Chinese FDI to their favor.
329

Id.
See CNOOC Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 21 (Dec. 31, 2012) (“[China National Offshore
Oil Company] has undertaken to us that we [CNOOC] will enjoy the exclusive right to exercise all of
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331
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VI. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
This Article catalogues the various heuristics and cognitive biases that
can influence people’s judgment of FDI. It finds that people resort to
various mental shortcuts when thinking about FDI, and that perceptions and
judgments of Chinese FDI are often guided directly by general impressions
of Chinese acquisitions and by feelings toward China and not through
deliberation of the merits of particular proposed transactions. What the
Western public and regulators often fail to realize is that they have merely
turned impressions into beliefs and that what they see on the surface is not
all there is. Indeed, when information about Chinese FDI is limited,
System 1 thinking can operate as a machine for quick conclusions.
Worryingly, various well-organized entities, such as private interest groups,
the media, and governments, are all too willing to promote, amplify, and
exploit such fear.
This Article thus calls for more effortful thinking about Chinese FDI
by Western policymakers. No informed FDI policy can be created without
a careful risk assessment of the particular FDI transaction. Before a
government acts, it must first assess the magnitude of the problem through
quantitative analysis. In judging the risks posed by Chinese investment,
policymakers should be aware that impulsive and intuitive responses can
often be biased. As the accuracy of the current official data on FDI is
likely distorted by a number of factors, it is especially important for
policymakers in both China and in Western countries to exert efforts to
improve the statistical tracking of Chinese FDI. Moreover, rigorous
empirical research is needed to evaluate the costs and benefits of Chinese
FDI in Western countries. How have Chinese companies operated and
performed in Western economies? What is their impact on local
economies? Have there been any Chinese investments that have posed risk
to national security? Without an accurate understanding of Chinese FDI
investment profiles, motives, and impacts on host countries, undue fears
about Chinese FDI are likely to be exploited by various interest groups
seeking regulatory response.
Second, no understanding of the FDI is complete without a
comprehensive picture of political and economic dynamics in China. The
fact that Chinese SOEs have been most active in making overseas
acquisitions in fact reflects the institutional characteristics of the distorted
Chinese economy, which has allocated resources to less efficient but
politically more powerful SOEs. Empire building incentives, exacerbated
by weak corporate governance structures and the lack of financial
disclosure, have been one of the most important factors in powering the
overseas expansion of Chinese SOEs.
Third, investment reviews of Chinese FDI should be conducted by
experts who understand both FDI and Chinese political economy. FDI
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experts are less vulnerable to cognitive biases and social influences as they
have routine access to accurate sources of information. Thus they are more
likely to reach a balanced view regarding the costs and benefits of a
particular foreign investment. In the case of the United States, CFIUS, an
expert agency that specializes in screening Chinese FDI, seems to be the
most capable of filling this role. At the same time, Congress’ increased
interference with FDI review makes it likely that the FDI review process
will remain susceptible to outside political forces and interest group
lobbying, as revealed in the CNOOC-Unocal transaction. The U.S.
Government should therefore be vigilant against the use of FDI regulations
as a protectionist tool by various interests groups—groups that often foster
anti-Chinese sentiment to advance personal agendas. In the case of Europe,
the merger unit within the Commission is unlikely to be a suitable
organization for dealing with FDI review of Chinese SOEs. While it is
well equipped with economic and legal experts on merger control
assessment, its staff may not possess the expertise in Chinese political
economy necessary for understanding the unique corporate governance
structure of Chinese SOEs. As reflected in recent cases involving Chinese
SOEs’ acquisitions in Europe, the intricate relationship between the CCP
and the SOEs has presented significant challenges to the Commission
during its antitrust reviews.
Fourth, in dealing with Chinese FDI, Western regulators should be
careful to avoid adopting extreme precautionary measures in response to
irrational fears, as this precludes a rational assessment of the costs and
benefits of proposed actions. Congress’ hostile response to CNOOC’s
proposed acquisition of Unocal has had severe political and economic
repercussions. As the world’s biggest outward foreign investor, the United
States has an interest to maintain an open foreign investment environment.
Similarly, the “worst-case scenario” approach that the Commission has
adopted in reviewing mergers involving Chinese SOEs shows that the
agency has clearly not thought through potential consequences. Such an
approach could jeopardize its jurisdiction on future important antitrust
cases involving Chinese SOEs. Moreover, it will tarnish the EU’s hardearned reputation as being an open investment environment. In such
circumstances, governments could explore alternative and more pragmatic
approaches and consider whether there are less intrusive measures that
could best minimize the costs of regulation.
Fifth, rather than viewing Chinese FDI as a threat, it is important to
remind ourselves that the increased FDI inflow from China is only part of
an overall trend of globalization. In fact, China’s growing integration with
the world economy should be viewed as a hopeful sign that China
envisages a peaceful relationship with other parts of the world. China is
currently the largest recipient of FDI. The more China invests in Western
countries, the more Chinese assets will be subject to foreign regulatory
control. This, in turn, could impose constraints on China as unequal
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treatment of foreign firms operating in China could spark retaliation against
Chinese firms operating abroad. This balance of power could thus
minimize conflicts and frictions between China and other countries.
Sixth, Chinese FDI presents challenges and opportunities not only to
Western countries, but to China as well. Chinese firms that venture
overseas will need to play the Western game. This could very well
pressure Chinese companies to adopt better corporate governance structure
and to provide greater transparency in operations and management. It also
pushes the Chinese government to conduct further reform and restructuring
of Chinese SOEs. Indeed, the reform of Chinese SOEs is still a work-inprogress and the challenges that Chinese companies face abroad are a
blatant reminder for the Chinese government that more radical political and
economic reforms are needed for China to achieve a successful transition
into a true market economy. It is imperative for Chinese SOEs, whether
listed or non-listed, to improve their corporate governance structures and to
provide more public disclosure of their overseas investments.
Last but not least, this Article casts doubt on the wisdom of Chinese
SOEs pursuing overseas expansion. Chinese policymakers will do well to
remember that market reform carried out in China in the past three decades
has contributed to its astonishing economic success. But overseas
expansion by Chinese SOEs marks a reversal of such a trend. The defects
in the institutional structure of the Chinese economy, coupled with the
weak corporate governance structure of Chinese SOEs and the lack of
financial disclosure, makes it highly likely that state assets are squandered
and wasted in overseas acquisitions. As SOEs are the main players in
Chinese outward investment, such expansion could lead to unintended
consequences in the form of further entrenching their position in China—a
development that would stifle market reform and have far-reaching
political and economic consequences for the future of China.

453

